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In their pursuit of influencing EU institutions and decision-makers, Nordic interest groups 
face the choice of directly contacting the decision-makers or generating pressure indirectly 
through mobilizing and/or changing the public opinion. After choosing their policy issues, 
interest groups have to determine to either lobby alone or to join coalitions.  
 
This thesis investigates the lobbying strategies chosen by Nordic interest groups that are 
registered in the EU Transparency Register. I build my theoretical argument on a prominent 
school of thought that claims that resource-rich interest groups are more likely to choose 
inside lobbying strategies compared to resource-poor groups. The argument is tested through 
a mixed methodological approach, combining the analyses of a built for purpose dataset that 
provides information about all Nordic interest groups registered in the EU Transparency 
register.  
 
The empirical analyses show that a considerable fraction of the Nordic interest groups 
chooses inside lobbying strategies and/or outside lobbying strategies. However, the online 
survey answers reveal that a large majority prefers to lobby in coalitions. Additionally, it 
seems that Norwegian interest groups focus on outside lobbying as well as inside lobbying 
strategies (mostly targeting the Commission), to compensate for their lack of representation in 
the EU institutions. While lobbying resources and group characteristics matter to the choice of 
most lobbying strategies, the aspect of building reputation and trust is of importance when it 
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Interest groups (IGs) have an important position in modern political systems and especially in 
the European Union (EU) (Greenwood 2017, 2). They can contribute with inputs and 
expertise in policy formulations and ensure that different views and opinions are made visible. 
Over the past three decades there has been a significant growth in lobbying in the EU and 
there is now a dense EU interest group system (Coen and Richardson, 2009, 3).  
 
Norway is not a member of the EU, but is largely influenced by EU policymaking, especially 
as a result of the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement. The EEA Agreement includes 
all EU policies with the exception of Common Agriculture and Fisheries Politics, Customs 
Union, Common Trade Policy, Common Foreign and Security Policy, Justice and Home 
Affairs or the Monetary Union (EFTA 2020). Through Norway’s economic and cultural 
closeness to Europe and agreements such as the EEA and Schengen, Norway’s involvement 
in the EU’s political, economic and legal cooperation is so extensive that it affects all policy 
areas and all Norwegians’ everyday lives. However, the EEA Agreement does not permit 
Norwegian authorities to participate in the decision-making or to have representation in the 
EU institutions. Accordingly, Norwegian interest groups will be interested in promoting their 
views on EU legislation and policymaking at a European level.  
 
In order to understand what lobbying strategies Norwegian interest groups use to influence 
EU policymaking, there is a comparison of Norwegian interest groups and the Nordic 
countries that are members of the EU: Sweden, Denmark and Finland. In this way, I am able 
to understand Norwegian interest groups’ strategies in a comparative perspective, and at the 
same time attempt to grasp to what extent the non-EU membership shapes lobbying strategies 
deployed by interest groups. Furthermore, the Nordic states constitute a particularly 
interesting case. “Indeed, while these states share several socioeconomic and political 
characteristics, they also differ in terms of their relationships with the European Union” 
(Leruth 2014, ii). 
 
The thesis aims to understand and explain the choice of lobbying strategies. Analysing 
lobbying strategies is important because they contribute and determine levels of lobbying 
success. Moreover, they provide important information about how national and sectional 
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interests are represented and articulated at the EU level. Because this thesis aims to 
understand the Nordic interest groups’ strategies applied to influence EU policymaking, there 
are two research questions:  
 
(1) What lobbying strategies do Nordic interest groups employ when trying to shape EU 
legislation? And (2) what explains the types of lobbying strategies used to influence EU 
institutions and decision-makers? 
 
 
1.1 Why study the lobbying strategies of Nordic interest groups? 
 
Previous literature on lobbying in the EU has mainly focused on interest groups from EU 
member states. The premises for Norwegian interest groups differ as they do not have the 
same opportunities to directly lobby their own national representatives at the European level. 
This makes it interesting to comparatively examine in more detail how Norwegian interest 
groups are lobbying EU legislation and policymaking, compared to interest groups from the 
other Nordic countries that are members of the EU. 
 
In addition to economic and practical consequences, this closeness to the EU has important 
constitutional implications. As Gullberg (2015, 3) points out, today Norway is almost as 
integrated in the EU as other EU member states. Considering that EUs policymaking affects 
Norway tremendously, it is rational to anticipate that Norwegian actors will try to influence it. 
However, despite the strong opposition to European integration observed in the Norwegian 
population, the relationship between Norway and the EU is by several scholars declared as 
special (Leruth 2014; Eliassen and Peneva 2011). Scholars argue that Norway differs from 
other EFTA countries because of its extraordinarily close relationship to the EU (Leruth 
2014). Nonetheless, as an EEA member, Norway lacks representation in the EU institutions. 
Since Norwegians have voted against full EU membership, and the main reason was to protect 
Norway's sovereignty, it has led to what Eriksen and Fossum (2014) call the “Norwegian 
Paradox". The “Norwegian Paradox” is structural and cannot be solved within the frames of 
today. However, there are largely two ways in which Norwegian actors can try to influence 
EU policymaking: directly approaching Brussels or the national government (Egeberg 2003, 
18). 
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The theoretical scope of this thesis is not only interesting to the case of Norway but could 
perhaps also be applicable to other countries outside the EU. Studying an EEA country 
highlights how countries outside the EU try to influence policymaking in the EU. Broader 
knowledge on alternative forms of attachment is also of importance to the EU, which is 
looking for models for cooperation with other states in Europe, as well as for countries 
seeking to join the EU, or seeking to be resolved by affiliation with the EU (Egeberg and 
Trondal 1999, 134). Additionally, the thesis provides insights about the Danish, Swedish and 
Finnish interest groups and their lobbying strategies.  
 
Only by adopting a comparative perspective, can I understand whether the Norwegian interest 
groups act similarly to interest groups from EU member states or whether they act differently. 
“Comparison provides a basis for making statements about empirical regularities and for 
evaluating and interpreting cases relative to substantive and theoretical criteria” (Ragin 1987, 
1). Sweden, Denmark and Finland are similar to Norway in terms of characteristics of the 
interest group system: all are considered corporatist states (Jahn 2016). But while Norway is 
not an EU member, the other three are. I want to explore whether this aspect plays a role in 
how Norwegian interest groups choose their strategies to lobby EU policymaking.  
 
 
1.2 Clarifications and assumptions  
 
It is crucial for any research to be specific on what is studied, and to be aware of what 
methods are available and possible in order to study the given phenomenon (George and 
Bennett 2005, 74). Often this becomes clearer when clarifying what is not studied (Goertz 
2006, 32).  
 
Firstly, it is not the purpose of this thesis to discuss the democratic aspect of the EEA 
Agreement and the Norwegian paradox. The approach in this context is often that Norway and 
the EEA countries do not have the opportunity to participate in the decision-making process, 
thus rendering the Agreement as undemocratic (Eide et al. 2003; Emerson et al. 2002; Eriksen 
2008). Lack of EU participation as a result of the EEA Agreement is, to some extent, an 
institutional fact that cannot be changed without active action to change the framework of the 
agreement or the form of association with the EU. However, the consequences of the lack of 
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participation can be modified with different tools – channels of interest representation being 
one of them.  The focus of the thesis is therefore to investigate what lobbying strategies 
Norwegian interest groups apply and compare them to the other Nordic countries that are 
members of the EU. 
 
Secondly, although Iceland is a Nordic country1 and part of the EEA Agreement, it is not 
included in the comparison. As previously mentioned, Norway has a special connection to the 
EU compared to other EEA/EFTA countries and countries outside the EU. Furthermore, 
Iceland did not share the Nordic tradition of corporatism – which is the basis of comparison 
(Siaroff 1999). 
 
Thirdly, much of the literature focuses on strategies and influence without really separating 
the two. There is considerable emphasis on lobbying influence (and how to measure it). As 
the literature reveals, measuring actual lobbying influence is very difficult and it is hard to say 
anything about the causal relationship (see for example Dür 2008 and Lowery 2013 for 
discussions on the concept and measurement of influence). Clearly, even though a policy is in 
line with the aim of a specific interest group, it is not feasible to see it as a direct consequence 
of the lobbying of that particular interest group. I am not seeking to measure the degree of 
lobbying influence of Nordic interest groups in the EU. I only identify and explain the choice 
of lobbying strategies. Nevertheless, an important step to understand lobbying influence is to 
study lobbying strategies and what explains them (Binderkrantz et al. 2015, 98) 
 
Lastly, I assume that interest groups are boundedly rational actors. With the aim of 
influencing policymaking in the EU, they are rational in that they choose the best possible 
strategy (for them) to do so. Thus, the choice of lobbying strategy is decisive for preference 
attainment. However, they are boundedly rational2 because they often lack information to 
make ideal decisions (Simon 1955; Dür and Mateo 2016, 23). Moreover, some studies include 
the element of influence on policymaking being a goal or not (for example Binderkrantz et al. 
2015). I am not doing so, considering that I only look at interest groups registered in the EU 
Transparency Register. It is reasonable to assume that when interest groups are registered in 
the EU Transparency Register, they have the aim to shape and make their demands and 
preferences heard in the EU policymaking process (Bunea 2018).  
 
1 “Nordic states” shall not be confused with “Scandinavia”, which only includes Norway, Denmark and Sweden. 
2 To read more about the concept of bounded rationality, see for example Simon (1995) 
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1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 
In Chapter 2 I present and conceptualize key concepts for the thesis: lobbying, interest group 
and lobbying strategies. Next I examine and discuss existing theories and literature on the 
choice of lobbying strategies, in addition to a brief examination of the background of the 
Nordic countries. Subsequently, I generate my theoretical argument and hypotheses on what 
lobbying strategies Nordic interest groups choose and why. 
 
The research design of the thesis is presented and discussed in Chapter 3. The overall aim of 
the thesis is to tell the story about the lobbying strategies that Nordic interest groups deploy to 
influence and shape EU decision-making. To answer the research questions, I apply a mixed 
methodological approach, combining the analysis of qualitative and quantitative empirical 
evidence. Chapter 4 consists of the analyses which are largely divided into three parts: 
descriptive analysis, explanatory analysis and survey analysis. At the end of this chapter there 
is a summary of the empirical analyses. In Chapter 5 I provide concluding remarks, in 













2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
In this chapter I lay down the theoretical framework of the thesis. I start by presenting some 
key concepts, before reviewing central literature on interest groups and their lobbying 
strategies. Lastly, I present my theoretical argument and hypotheses. 
 
 
2.1 Conceptual framework  
 
2.1.1 What is lobbying? 
 
“Lobbying” is a concept with different interpretations – also among various interest groups 
that in fact are lobbying, as it is defined in this thesis. In line with the EU literature, lobbying 
is in this thesis broadly understood as all activities with the goal of influencing EU legislation 
and policymaking (Gullberg 2015, 1534). Interest groups lobby the EU institutions, policy 
makers, the public and the media to state their preferences and to impact the policy-making 
process (Weiler and Brändli 2015, 2; Dür and Mateo 2016, 1). The ultimate goal of interest 
groups lobbying strategies is to influence and shape decision-making processes and outcomes 
and to bring closer to their ideal point. 
 
Furthermore, as Bouwen (2002, 368) argues, lobbying activities in the EU should be 
considered as an exchange relation and not a unidirectional activity from the interest groups. 
Interest groups are sources of information and policy input, and the EU institutions and 
policymakers need this expertise and inputs in the policy formulation. Moreover, being 
informed by knowledgeable interest groups in the policy formulation also enhances 
democratic legitimacy (Schmidt 2013).  The transparency of EU’s interest intermediation has 
increased, and the policy formulations are regarded as more accountable due to the 
involvement of interest groups who have knowledge and expertise on citizen support. Thus, 
there is an interdependent relation between the interest groups and the policymakers 
(institutions) – also known as “exchange theory and resource dependence” (Bouwen 2002, 
368). The interest groups demand access to decision-making, in exchange for giving the 
policymakers the information they need – and vice versa for the institutions.  
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2.1.2 What is an interest group? 
 
Interest groups are key actors in the design of politics and policies at the EU level. “They are 
widely perceived as channels of societal representation of policy demands and as key actors in 
effective problem-solving and implementation of EU legislation” (Bunea and Baumgartner 
2014, 1). In general terms, an “interest group” may be considered a group or an organisation 
that seeks to influence public policy on the basis of a specific interest or concern (Eising 
2008, 5). However, “the concept ‘interest group’ itself can be misleading as it refers to 
individuals, organisations or institutions that are associated in a body that aims at influencing 
public policy” (Beyers et al. 2008, 1108).  
 
The interest group concept is defined in many different ways in the existing literature and a 
range of different classification schemes are employed. This complicates comparisons 
between different studies and their findings (Beyers et al. 2008, 1106; Baroni et al. 2014, 
141). Furthermore, the concept choice is often driven by the issue area or lobbying venue 
under examination as well as a given author’s normative focus (Baroni et al. 2014, 143). 
Moreover, scholars studying interest groups skip the stage of conceptualization and rather 
take it for granted what falls into the category. Thus, in the existing literature, the terms used 
to describe this type of actors vary; everything from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
to business players, public authorities and social movements organisations (Beyers et al. 2008, 
1106). 
 
According to Beyers et al. (2008, 1106) three features must be present to define an actor as an 
“interest group”: organisation, political interests and informality. Organisation relates to the 
nature of the group and excludes unorganised broad movements and waves of public opinion. 
For example, broad social movements (such as the women’s movement) do not have 
organisational structures (Klüver 2013, 5). Yet, there are organisations that qualifies as 
interest groups within these social movements – such as the European Women’s Lobby 
(Klüver 2013, 5-6). Political interests refer to the aim of these organisations is to influence 
policymaking (Beyers et al. 2008, 1106). Informality relates to the fact that interest groups do 
not normally seek public office or compete in elections but pursue their goals through 
frequent informal interactions with politicians and bureaucrats (Beyers et al. 2008, 1106-
1107). This, however, does not rule out that important parts of state-group relations can be 
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heavily institutionalised (Beyers et al. 2008, 1106-1107). For example, some consider local 
governments as interest groups – the argument being that they are not, strictly speaking, part 
of government (Beyers et al. 2008, 1108-1109).  
 
Accordingly, in this thesis “interest groups” include organisations that try to influence 
policymaking. Nevertheless, the thesis also considers state authorities or regional authorities 
to be acting as an interest group (stakeholder), when participating in EU policymaking. Thus, 
this thesis employs a very broad definition of interest groups in order to cover a large range of 
actors. In the EU there is a diverse pool of interest groups: (1) professional consultancies/law 
firms/self-employed consultants, (2) in-house lobbyists and trade/business/professional 
associations, (3) non-governmental organisations, (4) think tanks, research and academic 
institutions, (5) organisations representing churches and religious communities, (6) 
organisations representing local, regional and municipal authorities, other public and mixed 
entities, etc., (7) regional governments, (8) local authorities and (9) non-EU based firms, 
organisations and associations (Transparency Register, 2020). I use interest groups as a 
collective term that encompasses the aforementioned types. 
 
 
2.1.3 Defining the dependent variable: lobbying strategies 
 
“The first step in measuring any phenomenon of interest to political scientists is to have a 
clear sense of what the concept is that we are trying to measure” (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, 
111). In their pursuit of political influence, interest groups face a choice of strategy and there 
are marked differences in lobbying behaviour of these actors. Lobbying strategies are roughly 
understood as how interest groups work to influence policy making and decision-making in 
the EU. The literature that studies lobbying strategies make use of a variety of labels: inside 
and outside (Mahoney 2008; Dür and Mateo 2016; Weiler and Brändli 2015); access and 
voice (Beyers 2004); administrative, parliamentary, media and mobilization strategies 
(Binderkrantz 2008); and judicial politics, grassroots lobbying and media strategies (Dür and 
Mateo 2016, 84).  
 
However, “inside” and “outside” lobbying strategies are considered the two main routes for 
groups to achieve their political objectives (Weiler and Brändli 2015, 3; Binderkrantz 2005, 
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695). The dichotomous divide between inside and outside lobbying strategies may not 
necessarily capture variations in the use of different strategies. For example, “it is interesting 
to investigate which groups tend to rely more on approaching bureaucrats and 
parliamentarians and which concentrate their efforts on approaching the media and mobilizing 
members” (Binderkrantz 2005, 705). Nonetheless, the dichotomy may be simplistic, but it 
also makes empirical work easier to implement.  
 
This thesis relies on the distinction of inside vs. outside lobbying, but also include coalition 
behaviour as an additional strategy. After choosing a policy issue, an interest group have to 
choose to either lobby alone or to join a coalition (Beyers et al. 2014, 132). Figure 2.1 on page 
12 summarizes and illustrates the conceptualization of lobbying strategies, while the 
operationalizations are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
 
 
Inside vs. outside lobbying 
 
Inside lobbying refers to lobbying activities that are directly aimed at influencing decision-
makers, and outside lobbying to lobbying activities that aim at mobilizing and/or changing 
public opinion (Dür and Mateo 2016, 85). The literature largely regards inside lobbying as a 
strategy of gaining access and outside lobbying as going public/voice strategy (Weiler and 
Brändli 2015, 3; Beyers 2004, 213).  
 
Inside lobbying strategies include meetings with bureaucrats and parliamentarians, 
participation in consultations as well as membership in Commission expert groups. With 
inside lobbying, interest groups must decide on which institutions to address as well as the 
governmental level at which they approach public actors (Beyers et al. 2014, 132). Inside 
lobbying tactics entail communicating directly to policymakers. This may happen through 
formal lobbying (e.g. drafting legislative language and Dear Colleague letters) or informal 
lobbying (e.g. face-to-face meetings and cocktail parties (Mahoney 2008, 9). Furthermore, 
information plays a crucial part for insider lobbying (Weiler and Brändli 2015, 3). Insider 
strategies can be particularly useful in providing technical information and giving expert 
knowledge. However, such strategies and the tactics that flow from them can limit broader 
mobilization (Beyers et al. 2014, 132). 
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Outside lobbying strategies, on the other hand, take place in a public arena via indirect 
communication from interests to policymakers – involving the broader public or particular 
parts of it (Beyers et al. 2014, 132). Going public is a more indirect strategy, which aims at 
putting pressure on policy makers via media campaigns, or by mobilizing citizens and staging 
protests (Weiler and Brändli 2015, 3). Outside lobbying strategies are applied to influence 
policymakers through the public, mobilizing constituents with press releases and conferences, 
political advertisements, contacts with journalists, protests and grassroots letter-writing 
campaigns (Mahoney 2008, 9; de Bruycker and Beyers 2019, 59). One important outside 
lobbying strategy is interest groups’ attempts to get the attention of the public and political 
elites through media. “A prominent presence in the news media is important for interest 
groups” (Binderkrantz 2012, 117).  
 
Strategies also differ as to the information that can be transmitted (Beyers et al. 2014, 132). 
Inside lobbying strategies can be particularly useful in providing expert knowledge; detailed 
operational or technical information. In contrast, outside lobbying strategies take place in a 
public arena to express the preferences via indirect communication from interest to 
policymakers (Beyers et al. 2014, 132). Thus, the distinction of inside and outside lobbying 
strategies is important because it tells us something about the type of information and thus the 
actors most likely to choose them. 
 
It is also worth mentioning that choosing an outside lobbying strategy is not necessarily a last 
resort or a worse alternative. It has been common to assume that an interest group chooses 
outside lobbying strategies only if it cannot gain access to the EU institutions (Binderkrantz 
2005, 695). However, it is important to focus on which strategies that the different interest 
groups choose, rather than focusing on the groups’ status (Binderkrantz 2005, 696; 
Binderkrantz and Krøyer 2012, 117). Not gaining access may not be the only reason for an 









Lobbying in coalitions  
 
An additional lobbying strategy is to form lobbying (advocacy) coalitions (Mahoney 2008; 
Bunea 2015; Beyers et al. 2014). Although lobbying through coalitions is a very frequent 
form of collective action at EU level, there have been few systematic studies of EU lobbying 
coalitions (Bunea and Baumgartner 2014, 20). Strategies are not just a matter of individual 
organisational behaviour. After choosing a policy issue, an interest group has to choose to 
either lobby alone or to join a coalition. Interest groups often enter into coalitions, a behaviour 
that has both recognized benefits and costs (Beyers et al. 2014, 132). In short, coalition 
behaviour entails that various interest groups come together and collaborate on lobbying 
(Bouwen 2002, 373). A lobbying coalition is defined as a group of actors who share the same 
policy goal (Klüver 2013, 18). This can take place through umbrella organisations or through 
ad hoc coalitions. 
 
Through umbrella organisations, interest groups may organise to achieve their shared goal. By 
lobbying together in a superior organisation, and not alone, it may be easier to attain influence 
in the EU institutions. Umbrella organisations can be organised at a European level or a 
national level (Bouwen 2002, 373; Gullberg 2010, 41). Umbrella organisations usually 
possess a representative mandate because they are often organised by industrial sectors and 
thus have a high number of members. These are permanent and almost institutionalised 
organisations that work together, with a mutual staff, to influence policy areas they care about 
(Pijnenburg 1998, 306). 
 
Ad-hoc coalitions, on the other hand, are non-permanent collaborations of interest groups 
working together to reach a goal in a specific case (Mahoney 2008, 168). Typically, such 
coalitions dissolve after the case is resolved or if the interest groups no longer see it fit to 
continue the collaboration. Because ad-hoc coalitions are focused on specific cases, it is 
possible to concentrate resources and formulate a common stance. Furthermore, the 
organisation of and decision procedures in ad-hoc coalitions are less formal, which facilitates 






Lobbying strategies are not mutually exclusive  
 
The complexity regarding the different lobbying strategies is that they are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. In fact, they may be complementary, i.e. interest groups may 
simultaneously rely on both inside and outside strategies (Beyers 2004; Binderkrantz 2005; 
Dür and Mateo 2016, 80; Weiler and Brändli 2015). Some argue that interest groups with 
many resources might be more likely to implement both inside and outside lobbying strategies 
to gain larger influence on EU policymaking, due to their abilities of investing in both 
strategies (Weiler and Brändli 2015, 8). There is also literature claiming that policy conflict 
(i.e. level of polarization of stakeholders’ preferences over outcomes) leads to competition 
among interest groups and thus interest groups utilize all possible channels to gain influence 
(Dür and Mateo 2013, 665; Weiler and Brändli 2015, 8). Moreover, Binderkrantz and Krøyer 
(2012, 115) argue that “the more divisible a goal a group is pursuing, the more actively it 
engages in all types of influence strategies”. Regardless of whether one or more strategies are 
applied by interest groups, there are various theories as to which factors determine the choice 
of strategies. In the next section I examine existing theories, research and literature on interest 
groups’ lobbying strategies.  
 
 
 Figure 2.1: Conceptualization of lobbying strategies. 
Adapted from Mahoney (2008). 
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2.2 Theories explaining the choice of lobbying strategies 
 
The literature discusses several factors that may explain why interest groups choose certain 
lobbying strategies over others. Overall, there are three clusters of factors that affect the 
choice of lobbying strategies: (1) interest groups’ characteristics and level of lobbying 
resource-endowment; (2) features of the institutional setting in which lobbying takes place; 
(3) characteristics of the policy context in which lobbying takes place (i.e. policy area, issue 
salience, conflict, complexity) (Bunea 2014, 1226-1227; Dür and Mateo 2016, 8). In this part 
of the thesis I examine the existing literature on lobbying strategies with the intent to identify 
relevant hypotheses for the Nordic interest groups. 
 
 
2.2.1 The importance of actor characteristics and resources  
 
The first school of thought focuses on interest group characteristics and resources. The 
theoretical perspective is also referred to as the “resource-based perspective” (Beyers 2004, 
212). In short, the resource-based perspective argues that interest groups’ choice of lobbying 
strategies can be explained by organisational characteristics and resources. Organisational 
characteristics include, organisational structure, type of interest represented and resource 
endowment (e.g. financial, amount of expertise, membership size). Resources are, however, 
not only regarded as financial means, but can be “anything that can be used to sway the 
specific choices or the strategies of another individual” (Dahl 1961, 226). For example, this 
includes material resources such as financial means, but also resources like staff, expertise 
and information (Dür and Mateo 2016, 29-30).  
 
In sum, it is argued that resources and interest group characteristics are important for the 
interest groups’ choice of lobbying strategies (Beyers 2008, 1188; Dür and Mateo 2016, 5). A 
large number of interest group studies in the EU have traditionally focused on this this 






Actor characteristics  
 
The school of thought claims that characteristics such as group type (i.e. interest type 
represented) and organisational form explain which lobbying strategy an interest group 
applies. It is argued that interest type represented is an important factor in explaining which 
strategies interest groups choose, and that there are significant differences between interest 
groups when it comes to the choice of lobbying strategies (Dür and Mateo 2016, 2; 
Binderkrantz 2005, 695). “Interest type represented” is meant by types such as those referred 
to in the conceptualization of interest groups, but can be further divided into: (1) business 
organisations, (2) consultancies, (3) citizen groups/NGOs, (4) trade union/professional 
organisations, (5) institutions, (6)  public authorities and (7) other types (Bunea 2017; 
Greenwood and Dreger 2013; Greenwood 2017). 
 
Business groups are often highlighted as a special interest type compared to other groups. 
Bunea (2017, 60) calls it the distinction of “classic ‘business vs. public interest 
organisations’”. Business groups are mainly reckoned to prefer inside lobbying strategies as 
well as to be expected to have more access than other types of groups (Bunea 2017; 
Bernhagen and Mitchell 2009; Boräng and Naurin 2015; Dür and Mateo 2012; 2016). The 
general argument is that business groups tend to be relatively better equipped with technical 
information – which is needed for policymakers to formulate legislation (Dür and Mateo 
2016, 3). 
 
Furthermore, the literature often distinguishes between interest groups that represent “specific 
interests” and “diffuse interests” to identify interest types (Eising et al. 2017, 940; Weiler and 
Brändli 2015, 5). Specific interests are usually those that represent a specific economic or 
societal sector. Business interests are normally related to specific interests because they are 
said to be easier to mobilise, and citizen interests to diffuse interests because they are more 
difficult to mobilise (Eising et al. 2017, 940). The Norwegian company, Equinor, or the 
Danish company, A.P. Møller – Mærsk are examples of business groups. Diffuse interests, on 
their part, include for example environmental interest groups or interest groups fighting for 
animal welfare, such as Djurskyddet Sverige. Specific interest groups represent the interests 
of their members, and they promote policies whose benefits accrue mostly to these members. 
Diffuse interest groups, on the other hand, are organisations pursuing goals in the common 
interest (or what they perceive as the common interest) (Weiler and Brändli 2015, 5).  
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The general argument and findings are that interest groups that represent diffuse interests rely 
on outside lobbying to get more publicity for their lobbying efforts. Furthermore, interest 
groups that represent diffuse interest usually have less resources. Specific interest groups on 
the other hand, generally have more resources, are quite technical and make use of inside 
lobbying strategies (e.g. Eising et al. 2017, 940; Dür and Mateo 2016, 2; Pollack 1997, 575; 
Bunea 2013, 3-4; Bunea 2014, 1229; Mahoney 2008, 152; Beyers 2004, 216-217; 
Binderkrantz et al. 2015, 108; Weiler and Brändli 2015, 5).  Specific interest groups are also 
known to have more expert knowledge and thus focus on inside lobbying strategies, compared 
to diffuse interest groups (Bunea 2014, 1229).  
 
Because interest groups may attempt to convey technical information and to lobby on more 
complex policy issues, they know it is more efficient to choose an inside lobbying strategy. 
Consequently, such interest groups lobby bureaucrats more intensively, and most likely with 
the EU Commission as their main target (Eising 2007, 394; Greenwood 2017, 25). Since the 
EU institutions need relevant information, having expert knowledge makes it more likely for 
interest groups to choose an inside lobbying strategy. Interest groups with diffuse interests, on 
the contrary, have an advantage in terms of access to information about public preferences 
(Eising 2007; Bouwen 2002; Dür and Mateo 2016). Such “political information” is important 
for the legitimacy of the EU and its policymaking. Groups pursuing general interest (diffuse 
interests) are found to mainly lobby the European parliament and the media (Binderkrantz and 
Krøyer 2012, 115). 
 
Organisational form is also claimed to matter for the choice of lobbying strategies. 
Organisational form refers to two different types of organisational characteristics: 
membership vs. non-membership-based organisations, as well as European 
associations/federations, national associations or individual associations (interest groups 
lobbying on their own). For example, European umbrella organisations have greater resources 
(e.g. financial, staff size and expert knowledge) than national or individual organisations 
(Bunea 2013, 3-4). Hence, they are expected to most likely choose inside lobbying strategies. 
However, critics have argued that precisely due to overwhelming resources and memberships, 
it diminishes the ability of collective action (Bunea 2014, 1238; Bouwen 2002, 377; Beyers 
2008, 1201). Nevertheless, Bunea’s (2014, 1238) findings maintain that European 
associations overcome such challenges. Bunea (2015, 294) finds that EU lobbying 
coordination is enabled by membership within European association. National associations 
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are expected to have a disadvantage of conducting inside lobbying strategies, while individual 
organisations should be very efficient in the provision of access goods (information) (Bouwen 
2002). It remains to see whether the same arguments apply to the Nordic interest groups, 
considering the strong corporatist traditions.  
 
 
Lobbying resources matter  
 
The resource-based perspective argues that financial endowment is an essential resource (Dür 
and Mateo 2016, 2). The more money an interest group has, the more resources and assets it 
gains access to (for example employees and information). Having financial resources makes it 
possible to spend more; to use more money on gathering information and/or to hire competent 
people in the field of interests. Additionally, more financial resources make it possible to put a 
greater emphasis on influencing policymakers directly through inside lobbying strategies. The 
argument is that financial resources secure the interest groups a larger and better qualified 
staff and hence they can afford having more direct meetings with policymakers (i.e., relying 
on an inside lobbying strategy) (Weiler and Brändli 2015, 8; Dür and Mateo 2013, 672).  
 
In comparison, resource-poor interest groups are more likely to join coalitions. In order to 
mobilize for a policy debate, resource-poor groups need to find resources, but also to be 
restrictive once they have some. Because coalitions pool resources, and coalitions are less 
risky, coalition behaviour should be an attractive lobbying strategy for research-poor interest 
groups. The opposite is true for research-rich interest groups (Mahoney 2008, 172).  
 
Staff size, Brussels office, expertise and organisational form are considered important 
resources and also affect the choice of lobbying strategies. Staff size, it is argued, matters in 
the same way as financial means: large interest groups have more resources to use on inside 
lobbying strategies (Bouwen 2002, 373). Furthermore, only large interest groups have enough 
resources to establish a representative office in Brussels (Bouwen 2002, 374). The literature 
indicates that having a Brussels office makes it easier to get closer to EU policymaking. “A 
presence in the European capital suggests a higher level in engagement in the interest 
community and likely significantly more informational resources” (Mahoney 2004, 452). 
Having a Brussels office will enable inside lobbying strategies (Mahoney 2004, 453; Bunea 
2014, 1229; Bouwen 2002, 374). However, it will also be easier to engage in outside lobbying 
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(Mahoney 2008, 163). Having a Brussels office is an indicator of resources, and interest 
groups with limited financial resources will accordingly be less able to establish a Brussels 
office (Bunea 2014, 1229; Mahoney 2004, 452). Bouwen (2002, 374) argues that interest 
groups without Brussels offices should join coalitions or a third party, in order to have the 
opportunity to lobby at a European level.  
 
Expertise is another resource that is especially regarded as important in the EU and has been 
extensively recognised in the literature (Bouwen 2002; Mahoney 2008; Beyers et al. 2014; 
Bernhagen et al. 2015; Weiler and Brändli 2015; Dür and Mateo 2016). Variation in interest 
groups’ access to decision-makers is explained by different levels of endowment with 
different types of information. For the resource-based perspective, information is an 
especially important factor for the choice of lobbying strategies (Eising 2007, 387). “Well-
informed groups are best positioned to provide much needed information to EU decision-
makers and thus influence the EU policymaking process” (Chalmers 2013, 475). As 
mentioned in the conceptualization of ‘lobbying’, information is crucial for the EU 
institutions in their policy formulations. The EU institutions have small administrations and 
thus depend on receiving relevant knowledge from interest groups (Klüver et al. 2015a, 451).  
 
According to Bouwen (2002, 36), information can be of different types: (1) Expert 
knowledge, (2) Information about the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI) and (3) 
Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI). Expert knowledge refers to 
expertise and technical knowledge and is crucial for EU policymaking and legislation in a 
particular policy area (Bouwen 2002, 369). For example, Stora Enso can provide technical 
expertise to help EU officials and politicians understand the particularities of renewable 
solutions in biomaterials. IEEI relates to needs and interest of a sector in the European 
economic arena, i.e. the so-called Internal Market. For example, European Banking 
Federation may state “the needs and interests of its members with regard to new capital 
adequacy rules for commercial banks” (Bouwen 2002, 369). IDEI concerns the needs and 
interests of a sector in the domestic market. Swedish Bankers’ Association, for example, can 
provide information on the needs and interests of its members with regard to new capital 




These can be further distinguished into two types of information: technical information and 
political information (Dür and Mateo 2016, 30). Technical information reduces uncertainty 
about the consequences of policy choices and political information reduces uncertainty about 
public preferences (Dür and Mateo 2016, 30). 
 
When it comes to EU legislation, the Commission and the national governments (EP and the 
Council) are generally considered to be most in need of technical information (Bouwen 2002, 
379; Dür and Mateo 2016, 183). The Commission needs expertise to draw up legislative 
proposals and national governments require technical information to check to what extent the 
proposals are in line with their preferences and how they can be implemented. Both actors are 
also eager to gain support in implementing the proposed policies. Members of European 
Parliament, however, are relatively less in need of technical information than executive 
institutions (Bouwen 2002, 381; Dür and Mateo 2016, 184). At the same time, they are 
relatively more in need of political information (Coen and Richardson 2009, 9; Dür and 
Mateo 2016, 184). Re-election concern makes parliamentarians relatively more eager to show 
consideration for the interests of broad parts of society than executive institutions. Thus, 
having information is decisive for the choice of lobbying strategies: having resources, such as 
experts, make it more likely for interest groups to choose inside lobbying strategies. 
 
 
2.2.2 The power of institutions 
 
As a criticism of the resource perspective, Beyers (2004, 227-228) argues that lobbying 
strategies cannot be systematically explained by the difference between diffuse and specific 
interests. His findings show that specific interest groups are more likely to use inside 
strategies, but that the differences relative to diffuse interest groups are not very large. 
Moreover, his results do not support the claim that diffuse interest groups seek more access to 
the European Parliament than to the European Commission, or that specific interest groups 
seek more access to the European Commission than do diffuse interests (Beyers 2004, 224).  
 
Several scholars argue that lobbying behaviour cannot be fully understood from a purely 
rationalistic behaviour perspective (Weiler and Brändli 2015, 2). As Miard (2014, 74) points 
out: “in theory, interest groups can choose between all the strategies and targets; in practice, 
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however, there are constraints on which lobbying routes they are able to use”. Critics argue 
that the resource perspective does not take into account for other explanatory factors, such as 
institutional mechanisms (Beyers 2004, 213). Although they do not necessarily disagree that 
resource factors also explain lobbying strategies, they argue that resources alone cannot cover 
the whole story. Klüver et al. (2015a, Beyers et al.2014; Eising et al. 2015; Klüver et al. 
2015b), argue that previous research has paid considerable attention to individual interest 
group characteristics, and that the effect of contextual variables has largely been neglected. 
Contrary to the resource-based explanations, institutionalists emphasize that institutional 
settings lead to different incentives and constraints that again determine interest groups’ 
lobbying strategies (Beyers 2004, 212). 
 
 
The EU institutions as lobbying venues 
 
The literature argue that institutional settings, such as the extent to which political institutions 
are dependent on the information provided by interest groups and the type of system of 
interest representation at the national level, are essential for the choice of lobbying strategies 
(Dür and Mateo 2016, 9-10; Beyers et al. 2014, 132). The institutional setting “sets the access 
points, shapes the communication channels by establishing the rules of participation and 
determines the needs of policymakers in their informational exchange with interest groups” 
(Bunea 2014, 1226-1227).  
 
“Interest associations rarely face one monolithic government” (Beyers 2004, 212). Different 
institutions need and/or are interested in multiple types of resources (Dür and Mateo 2016, 9-
10). As mentioned, this can be technical information (i.e. needed for details in the policy 
formulations) or political information (i.e. the citizen support on a specific policy). The EU 
consists of different arenas and offers multiple access points, which means that various 
institutional actors are targeted to varying degrees by different types of interest groups 
(Beyers 2004, 212). At the same time, the policymaking procedure of an issue affects which 
institutions that are targeted (Mahoney 2008, 130). Consequently, the institutional view would 
argue that the EU institutions and different arenas shape the lobbying behaviour and choice of 
strategies of interest groups. As opposed to the resource perspective, the institutional view 
contends that interest groups are rational actors that adjust their lobbying strategies so as to fit 
the informational or resource needs of institutions and policymakers they want to access and 
 20 
influence. Rather, the overall argument is that the differences in informational needs between 
the institutions determine which interest groups the decision-makers will listen to.  
 
In attempting to influence EU policymaking and legislation, the European Commission and 
the European Parliament are the most popular institutions for interest groups (Beyers 2004, 
224). The Commission is regarded as the most important institution because it has the sole 
right of legislative initiative and thus responsible for drafting of legislative proposals (Coen 
and Richardson 2009, 20; Eising 2008, 12). The literature on lobbying strategies argues that 
the earlier you lobby in the process, the higher the chances to shape the agenda and decision-
making process (Bouwen 2002; Eising 2008). After the legislation proposal it is sent to the 
European Parliament and the Council. In the decision-making phase, interest groups can 
lobby both the EP and the Council. Out of these two institutions, the EP is considered to be 
the most important institution because it is easier to access information and to make contact 
with its policymakers, than in the Council (Greenwood 2017, 25). Moreover, even though the 
Commission is regarded as the most important institution for lobbying interest groups, the 
EP’s importance for lobbying has increased with its expanded decision powers through the 
treaties (Nugent 2017, 202-203).  
 
A significant part of European legislation touches upon new areas with a quite complex 
character, and therefore the Commission is keen to gain expert knowledge (Beyers 2004, 
219). According to this view, inside lobbying strategies are employed to influence the 
Commission, while outside lobbying strategies are preferred when lobbying the European 
Parliament (Bunea 2014, 1226-1227; Beyers 2004, 219). However, the European Parliament 
and its growing legislative role forces the MEPs to consider factual and technical expertise as 
well (Beyers 2004, 219). Nevertheless, since they are elected officials, they are expected to be 
sensitive to the public.  
 
The resource perspective would argue that only resource-rich groups will try to lobby the 
European Commission. This has led to research arguing that the EU is biased towards EU-
level groups and resource-rich groups (e.g. Eising 2007; Binderkrantz et al. 2015). However, 
many interest groups participate, for example, in the Commission’s online consultations and 
present their interest directly to the Commission and European Parliament (Eising et al. 2017, 
943). As Beyers (2004, 218) argues, policymakers know that interest groups lobbying specific 
interest are strategic, and hence also opens up for other types of interest groups – through for 
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example open consultations. Thus, this institutional structure facilitates mobilization of a large 
variety of interests (Beyers 2004, 218). Furthermore, it is not necessarily the case that specific 
interest groups do not seek access to the EP. On the contrary, it is likely that the mobilization 
of diffuse interests towards the EP forces specific interest to also increase their efforts to the 
EP (Beyers 2004, 219).  
 
 
The impact of national legacy and of the national interest group system   
 
Another structural explanation of lobbying strategies is systems of interest representation at 
the national level. National interest groups frequently lobby the European institutions directly. 
Klüver et al. (2015a, 450-451) argue that the variation of lobbying strategies is partly 
explained by the systems of interest representation. The overall argument is that domestic 
systems of interest representation shape lobbying strategies of interest groups (Dür and Mateo 
2013, 670; Marshall and Bernhagen 2017, 982; Eising et al. 2017, 942). National systems of 
interest representation might shape the behaviour of interest groups at supranational level 
because the national level is where they were lobbying traditionally and where they have 
established their routines. This only accounts for national associations and individual interest 
groups, however. 
 
Scholars who study this have most often divided between corporatist and pluralist systems 
(Eising et al. 2017; Marshall and Bernhagen 2017; Dür and Mateo 2016). The difference 
between the two is that corporatist systems is characterized by an institutionalization of 
interest groups representing both capital and labour interests (Dür and Mateo 2016, 10). There 
have been some conflicting arguments and findings in the literature (Eising 2007, 17). Some 
argue that interest groups from corporatist systems have the possibilities to influence the 
national policymaking, and hence do not focus on EU-lobbying. Or if they do, they will 
largely rely on encompassing groups to represent their interests (Marshall and Bernhagen 
2017, 987). The opposite is true for interest groups from pluralistic systems: because they are 
more excluded from the national policymaking, they will focus on EU-lobbying (Klüver et al. 
2015a, 455). Similarly, it has been argued that because the EU is more or less considered a 
pluralistic system, interest groups from pluralist systems at the domestic level will have an 
advantage because they do not need to change their routines (Marshall and Bernhagen 2017, 
987). 
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However, Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009, 171) found that there is not a difference in lobbying 
behaviour between interest groups from corporatist and pluralist systems. A decade later, 
Marshall and Bernhagen (2017, 997) find that in fact it has reversed: interest groups from 
pluralist systems are more likely to lobby their national government, while interest groups 
from corporatist systems are more likely to lobby at the EU level. It is worth mentioning, 
however, that these are findings based on a comparison of British and German firms. They are 
nonetheless good examples of pluralist and corporatist systems. Germany is one of the most 
corporatist countries in the world, whereas the UK is one of the most pluralist countries (Jahn 
2016, 65). 
 
There is also an argument stating that interest groups that have a weak influence over national 
governments, may be tempted into a “by-pass” strategy, while interests that have a privileged 
position in domestic policy networks may be initially reluctant to embark on EU-level 
strategies (Callanan 2011, 1).  “However, such strategies are not static but rather evolve and 
change over time – there is evidence of policy learning and a trend towards ‘venue shopping’ 
at both national and EU levels. On the other hand, those interests that remain weak at national 
level may also remain weak at European level” (Callanan 2011, 1). Moreover, Dür and Mateo 
(2012, 973-974) argue that interest groups from small EU member states will engage in more 
direct lobbying than those from large member states, because their governments have less 
power in the Council of Ministers. 
 
Although interest groups’ lobbying strategies are shaped by their domestic systems, findings 
also show that interest groups adjust to the institutional setting they are active in (Eising et al. 
2017, 941-942). Interest groups from corporatist systems have been compelled to adjust their 
lobbying strategies in the EU. Thus, it is argued that this has in turn given them an advantage, 
compared to interest groups from pluralist systems, who have not needed to (at least to the 
same extent) adapt to supranational policy arena of the EU (Marshall and Bernhagen 2017, 
997). 
 
Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009, 158) argue that interest groups from countries with corporatist 
traditions put a greater emphasis on influencing or lobbying through coalitions. Berkhout 
(2010, 2) also argue that interest groups from corporatist systems are assumed to be more 
cooperative and are “valued by politicians for their representative nature and expertise”. At 
the same time, it is argued that interest groups from pluralist systems are assumed to compete 
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with each other, making them less likely to join coalitions (Berkhout 2010, 2). Furthermore, 
Berkhout (2010, 116) argues that interest groups from corporatist systems rely more on inside 
lobbying, compared to IGs from pluralist systems. This, he argues, is due to the consensus 
politics in corporatist systems. Given this, it seems that interest groups from corporatist 
systems rely more on inside lobbying and that interest groups from pluralist systems rely on 
outside lobbying strategies. Furthermore, IGs from corporatist systems are more likely to join 
coalitions, compared to IGs from pluralist systems who will more likely lobby alone. Dür and 
Mateo (2016, 102), however, only find a small support for the argument that interest groups 





2.2.3 The impact of policy context 
 
The third cluster of explanations emphasizes the importance of policy context on forming the 
interest groups’ choice of lobbying strategies. Such contextual factors include issue-level 
characteristics and policy-area characteristics (Bunea 2014, 1227).   
 
 
Issue level characteristics 
 
Issue level characteristics is argued to matter for the choice of lobbying strategies. Key issue 
level characteristics refer to (1) issue salience, (2) the degree of conflict on the issue and (3) 
its complexity. Issues can be of a distributive, regulatory or redistributive type (Lowi 1964) It 
is argued that the policy type is important for the choice of lobbying strategies. Whether the 
policy is regulatory, distributive or redistributive should have considerable consequences for 
lobbying strategies (Klüver et al. 2015a, 451; Dür and Mateo 2016, 5). They can be more or 
less complex; and they can be more or less salient to the broad public. Thus, other 
differentiations of policy types include complex issues versus simple ones, or conflictual and 
salient issues (Mahoney 2008, 40-41; Eising et al. 2017, 942). 
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Lowi (1964) argued that policies with direct consequences for public budgets are often highly 
salient to the public even if they are not specifically influenced by the policy problem or its 
solution. Thus, much attention is likely to focus on proposed policies with funds attached and 
are likely to generate more organisational activity (Rasmussen et al. 2014, 6). Put differently, 
distributive and redistributive policies will most likely have a high salience and conflict. In 
contrast, regulatory policies often address a narrower set of interests. Such issues could be 
less salient to the general public because the direct costs of regulation are carried by the target 
organisations themselves (Rasmussen et al. 2014, 6). To sum up, the policy type influences 
and generate different levels of conflict and controversy and that in turn affect the choice of 
lobbying strategies. 
 
Issues can feature high on the political agenda and gain much public attention, or they can be 
of concern to a handful of actors. Issue salience thus influences lobbying strategies, according 
to the contextual view (Klüver et al. 2015a, 451-452). High issue salience can trigger an 
attention cascade that motivates an ever-greater number of outsiders to get involved in the 
campaign. On such issues, decision-makers will feel great pressure to adopt policies in line 
with public opinion, which should favour the lobbying outsiders (Dür and Mateo 2016, 44). 
The higher issue salience, and the larger the issue, the more likely an interest group will go 
outside “and capitalize on the attention” (Mahoney 2008, 150; Beyers 2008; 1992; Bunea 
2014, 1227). 
 
Moreover, highly salient issues are also expected to lead to coalition behaviour (Mahoney 
2008, 171; Eising et al. 2017, 942). This is because high-salience issues need broad public 
support and often involve costly strategies – which again incentivises to pool resources 
(Mahoney 2008, 171). Additionally, high salience issues may drive lobbyists to use more and 
a broader range of inside lobbying strategies (Mahoney 2008, 143). The argument is that the 
more important an issue is to the public, and the bigger the impact is on the public, drive 
interest groups to use inside lobbying strategies so that they can communicate their positions 
to policymakers who know the stakes are high (Mahoney 2008, 128). 
 
Another issue characteristic is the degree of policy conflict. Policy conflict means the level of 
polarization of stakeholders’ preferences over outcomes. Issues where only a few groups 
pursue their interest are often highly technical and limited to one specific sector (Beyers 2008, 
1992). Furthermore, for issues that hardly raise any attention, interest groups should be able to 
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move close to the legislative (Klüver et al. 2015a, 451-452). In the case of distributive issues, 
business interests and professional associations can expect little opposition from other 
business or professional interests, as the costs of the policy are spread thinly across a large 
number of actors. In such a situation, they have an incentive to focus on inside lobbying since 
an outside strategy may draw attention to a lobbying campaign that is best carried out covertly 
(Dür and Mateo 2013, 665; Eising et al. 2017, 942).  
 
The situation changes when they lobby on regulatory issues: here the expectation is for 
different coalitions of business and professional interests to face each other on opposite sides 
of the debate (Dür and Mateo 2013, 665).  Some policies are highly conflictual and divide 
interest groups into different sets of competing advocacy coalitions (Klüver et al. 2015a, 452). 
The argument is that conflict gives groups an incentive to band together to face a common 
threat (Mahoney 2008, 171). Furthermore, both sides then may be pushed towards an outside 
strategy to gain an advantage over the adversary (Dür and Mateo 2013, 665). Interest groups 
will therefore be likely to make use of several strategies (Weiler and Brändli 2015, 8).  
 
It is also argued that issue complexity matters for the choice of lobbying strategies. For 
different types of issues, policymakers will seek and need different information. For example, 
some issues require expert knowledge while other need broad-based political support (Beyers 
2008, 1190). Some legislative proposals are relatively simple and confined to a particular 
field, whereas others are highly complex, as they deal with extremely technical matters and 
have repercussion for multiple fields. In such instances, the EU institutions need expert 
knowledge (Klüver et al. 2015a, 451). As mentioned, on technical legislative proposals, 
interest groups prefer inside lobbying strategies (Bunea 2014, 1227). Yet, the demand for 
input from interest groups varies with the degree of complexity, and it can therefore be 
expected that interest groups choice of lobbying strategies should vary with the complexity of 
policy proposals (Klüver et al. 2015a, 451). 
 
Although there are several scholars that argue that policy context matters, so far there is little 
evidence that issue characteristics matter for the choice of lobbying strategies (Dür and Mateo 
2016, 9). For example, Mahoney (2008) and Baumgartner et al. (2009, 150) only find limited 
influence of issue salience on lobbying strategy choice. What matters, according to them, is 
whether actors defend the status quo or pursue policy change. In a study of environmental 
lobbying in the EU, however, Junk (2016) finds that issue characteristics matter more than 
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group characteristics. She concludes that outside lobbying should dominate on issues of high 
public salience and low complexity. Dür and Mateo (2016, 16), on the other hand, found that 





The EU’s competences vary in the different policy areas. For example, trade policy is an 
exclusive competence of the EU, whereas the EU’s role on culture is largely limited to 
coordination. Thus, the policy area in which interest groups are active, influences the choice 
of lobbying strategies (Dür and Mateo 2016, 150). There is a variance in interest group 
activity across policy areas because the different policy areas differ in their needs (Coen and 
Katsaitis 2013, 1104).  
 
As mentioned, the Commission is regarded as the most important institution due to its power 
on initiating legislation. Yet, the Commission is rarely approached as a collegiate body; 
rather, interest groups maintain relations with one or more of its DGs that are responsible for 
specific policy areas (Eising 2008, 12). The Directorate-General (DG) has important influence 
on the content of the policy proposal. This means that the choice of lobbying strategies may 
depend on which DGs that are in charge of specific legislative initiatives (Klüver et al. 2015a, 
453). “The DGs form stronger (informal) ties with groups that provide relevant and reliable 
information over time and unique interest group clusters emerge across policy types” (Coen 
and Katsaitis 2013, 1105). Put differently, the access is limited to interest groups that can help 
the DGs to formulate policy in their respective policy area (Coen and Katsaitis 2013, 1107).  
 
Moreover, the EU can be considered a “chameleon pluralist system” (Coen and Richardson 
2009, 346; Coen and Katsaitis 2013, 1104). There is variation in actors-type and patterns of 
participation and lobbying behaviour across different policy areas (Bunea 2014, 1231). It is 
argued that in policy areas in which input legitimacy plays a major role, decision-makers have 
a greater need of political information, making them seek out groups that have a comparative 
advantage in providing that information, namely citizen groups. In policy areas in which 
output legitimacy is more important, decision-makers need technical information, creating an 
incentive for them to have contacts with business interest, which have a corporative advantage 
in providing that type of information (Dür and Mateo 2016, 204). For example, EU social 
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policy is marked by a system of sectoral corporatism. For business and labour, the expanding 
policy agenda in EU social policy has increased the significance of having a say in the EU’s 
decisions in this policy area. This means that policy areas such as the EU social policy, 
interest groups such as business and labour, play a privileged role (Coen and Richardson 
2009, 256).  
 
Interest groups mainly engage in interest representation. In doing so, they tend to be quite 
specialized in their fields of interest and thus lobby in policy areas that they identify as 
important for their activities (Dür and Mateo 2016, 83). The argument is that interest groups 
that are highly interested in a small number of policy areas, are also considered specialists in 
these policy areas. Because interest groups have this high-level of specialization, it may make 
them well-suited to provide decision-makers with expertise (inside lobbying strategy). Interest 
groups involved in many policy areas, however, may not have the same level of expertise and 
thus be considered generalists. For example, national associations (interest group consisting of 
individual organisations at the national level) have to deal with many policy issues and are 
therefore considered generalists rather than specialists. Like European associations, national 




2.3 The Nordic case: differentiated European integration and 
levels of corporatism 
 
According to the study of Jahn (2016, 59), Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland are among 
the top ten countries that are ranked as corporatist countries. They are thus all characterized as 
corporatist countries, but at slightly different levels. Sweden is ranked as number two, 
Norway as number five, Finland as number seven and Denmark as number ten. Nonetheless, 
while these states share corporatist characteristics, they differ in terms of their relationships 
with the European Union (Leruth 2014, ii).  
 
The Nordic countries became involved in the European integration at different points in time, 
and to dissimilar degrees. Denmark became a member of the European Union already in 
1973, while Finland and Sweden joined in 1995. Finland and Sweden were neutral states in 
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the Cold War, but due to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
Sweden and Finland could apply for EU membership. Norway, on the other hand, joined the 
EEA Agreement in 1994 (Egeberg 2003, 1).  
 
Finland, Sweden and Norway all had national referendums on EU-membership in 1994. In 
Finland, 56.9% supported EU membership, 52.3% in Sweden, while 47.7% favoured 
Norwegian EU membership. This was the second time Norwegians voted against EU 
membership, as Norway held a referendum in 1972 as well. Egeberg (2003, 7) argues that the 
centre-periphery dimension is the reason why Norwegians resist membership. He points to the 
fact that Sweden has had an extensive centralisation policy for a long time, which might 
explain the difference in the referendum turnout for Norway (Egeberg 2003, 8).  
 
Although Denmark, Finland and Sweden are all members of the EU, they differ in their 
integration. Firstly, Finland is considered as being close to the core of EU activity (Mouritzen 
and Wivel 2005, 95). Egeberg (2003, 23) argues that “the peculiar Finnish enthusiasm and 
involvement on all dimensions can probably only be accounted for by taking into 
consideration the ‘special relationship’ with the former Soviet Union during the cold war”. 
Sweden, however, is regarded as a “euro outsider on the inside” of the European Union (Miles 
2005; Lindahl and Naurin 2005; Leruth 2014). A “euro outsider” has been defined by Miles 
(2005, 4) as “a country that is a full member of the EU yet remains outside the euro-area and 
thus has not adopted the euro”. Sweden have de facto opted out of the third stage of the 
Economic and Monetary Union (Leruth 2014, 86).  
 
Likewise, Denmark can also be regarded a euro outsider. Through the Edinburgh Agreement, 
Denmark has opted out of three core EU policy areas: Economic and Monetary Union; 
aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy; as well as what was originally called the 
Justice and Home Affairs pillar (Leruth 2014, 2). The difference between Sweden and 
Denmark is that Sweden has a legal obligation to join the Eurozone, and consequently the 
Swedish case for differentiated integration is somewhat challenging to defend (Leruth 2014, 
86). Conversely, Denmark, has operated one of the most visible and institutional forms of 
differentiation in the European Union (Miles 2010). Moreover, as emphasised by Egeberg and 
Trondal (1999, 134), Norway may be “even more sectorally penetrated or harmonized” than 
other EU members regarding policy harmonization. Although Norway is only part of the EEA 
Agreement, it still involves a great deal of integration (Egeberg 2003).   
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Whether the differentiated integration of Denmark, Sweden and Finland has any impact on 
how interest groups from these countries act when lobbying the European Union, is difficult 
to say. In the case of Norway, Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) argue that Norwegian interest 
groups use direct lobbying strategies to make up for the fact that they do not have 
representation. Moreover, Dür and Mateo (2016, 110) argue that “consensus politics” in 
general should lead interest groups to rely more on inside lobbying. Taking into consideration 
the “opt-outs” among the member states and the peculiar agreements of the EEA countries, 
“differentiated integration (or membership)” might possibly be a more proper term than the 
simple “membership-non-membership dichotomy” (Stubb 1996; Egeberg and Trondal 1999; 
Egeberg 2003). Miard (2014), on the other hand, finds that EU membership determines how 
and where Norwegian companies lobby. Because Norwegian interest groups lack access, in 
particular to the EP and the Council, they lobby EU institutions less directly than Swedish 
companies. 
 
Despite the differentiated European integration, what the Nordic countries have in common is 
corporatism (Jahn 2016). Because Nordic interest groups are used to participate in national 
policymaking, it is natural for Nordic interest groups to lobby the European Union as well 
(source). Moreover, and as already mentioned, interest groups from corporatist systems have 
been compelled to adjust their lobbying strategies in the EU. Accordingly, it is argued that 
this has in turn given them an advantage, compared to interest groups from pluralist systems, 
who have not needed to (at least to the same extent) adapt to supranational policy arena of the 
EU (Marshall and Bernhagen 2017, 997). It remains to be seen whether there are differences 











2.4 Theoretical argument 
 
As presented, the literature discusses several factors that may explain why interest groups 
choose certain lobbying strategies over others. There are three schools of thought proposing 
explanations to the choice of lobbying strategies: (1) interest groups’ characteristics and 
lobbying resource-endowment; (2) features of the institutional setting in which lobbying takes 
place; (3) characteristics of the policy context in which lobbying takes place, i.e. policy area, 
issue salience, conflict, complexity (Bunea 2014, 1226-1227; Dür and Mateo 2016, 8).  
 
I build my argument on the first school of thought and argue that organizational lobbying 
resources and group characteristics are key explanations of lobbying strategy choice, while 
the two other approaches provide alternative explanations. The Nordic countries are very 
much similar regarding institutional framework: all the Nordic countries have high scores in 
corporatism and are among the top 10 corporatist countries in the world (Jan 2016, 59). Put 
differently, there are not major differences between the Nordic countries when it comes to 
system of interest representation. This means that there is not much variation in the 
institutional set up when it comes to the four analysed countries and this constitutes a constant 
across all four countries. Furthermore, although I do not disagree that policy context may 
matter, this is difficult to measure empirically and should remain a task for future studies. I 
believe that relying on the resource and characteristics-explanation is a necessary first step in 
explaining lobbying strategies of Nordic interest groups.  
 
I argue that lobbying resources seem to matter for the choice of lobbying strategies. More 
money/financial resources lead to better hires, more expertise and a higher ability to secure a 
higher number of direct meetings with a diversity of policymakers. In other words, interest 
groups with a large endowment of financial resources often choose to make use of inside 
lobbying, which they can afford and which is largely considered to be the most effective and 
efficient manner of influencing and shaping policymaking, especially given the technical 
nature of EU decision-making in which conveying technical information in consultations, 
meetings and face to face contact is crucial. Dür and Mateo (2013, 672) found that material 
resources increase business associations’ and decrease citizen groups’ and professional 
associations’ reliance on inside lobbying strategies. Furthermore, resource-rich organisations 
rely less on outside lobbying strategies (Weiler and Brändli 2015, 5). Resource-poor interest 
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groups, however, will rather choose outside lobbying or join a coalition. I thus expect the 
same for the interest groups from the Nordic countries: 
 
H1: Resource-rich groups are more likely to choose inside lobbying strategies, relative to 
outside strategies and lobbying in coalitions than resource-poor interest groups 
 
H2: Resource-poor groups are more likely to lobby through coalitions relative to inside and 
outside strategies than resource-rich interest groups 
 
As already pointed out, it is not only financial resources that are considered resources, but 
also expertise, staff size and whether you have a Brussels office are important resources. I 
therefore expect that higher staff size leads to a greater likelihood of inside lobbying 
strategies, similar to the fact that one has a Brussels office to do so. Hence, by resource 
richness I include financially rich organisations, as well as interest groups with a large staff 
size having a Brussels office. I consider financial resources as the most important, because it 
makes it possible to have a large staff size and a Brussels office. Financial resources translate 
into hiring experts, more lobbyists, high ability to generate expertise and technical 
information, as well as a high ability to professionalize the lobbying. However, staff size and 
Brussels office can be regarded as indicators of the financial resources of an interest group 
(Bouwen 2002; Mahoney 2004; Bunea 2014; Dür and Mateo 2016). 
 
Nevertheless, as previously touched upon, information about the public is also regarded an 
important asset. Type of information may play a role for which institution(s) that will be 
targeted by lobbying interest groups. When it comes to resources, one might expect a 
difference between the Commission and the EP in the level of inside lobbying strategies and 
types of interest groups lobbying, as lobbying the EP may not be as straightforward. MEPs are 
elected officials and are expected to be sensitive to the public, whereas the Commission is 
eager to gain expert knowledge. Consequently, (financial) resources may be more important 
when lobbying the Commission, compared to lobbying MEPs. Notwithstanding, as already 
stated, the European Parliament and its growing legislative role forces the MEPs to consider 
factual and technical expertise as well.  
 
Furthermore, it seems as though many scholars view inside lobbying strategies as the “best 
strategy”, and thereby disregard outside lobbying strategies as something an interest group 
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might prefer (Binderkrantz and Krøyer 2012, 117). Precisely due to this view, it has become 
common to explain choices of outside lobbying strategies by paying attention to an 
organisation’s inability to engage in inside lobbying strategies. Yet, it is less rational for an 
interest group that represents specific interests to aim at creating a media storm, compared to, 
for example, an interest group with environmental interests (Mahoney 2008, 151-152). 
 
Consequently, even though resources matter, group type also seems to determine which lobby 
strategies an interest group will choose. Following this argument, it is important to address the 
relationship between interest type represented and the level of organisational lobbying 
resources. Business groups are generally expected to have more resources, to be quite 
technical and have more expert knowledge, and hence to make use of inside lobbying 
strategies (Eising et al. 2017; Dür and Mateo 2016; Bunea 2013; Bunea 2014; Mahoney 2008; 
Beyers 2004). While on average business might be more resource rich this is not always the 
case. As for instance, there are NGOs that have relevant lobbying resources (e.g. the 
Norwegian interest group Bellona Europa). Given the considerations discussed above, I 
expect that: 
 
H3: Business organisations are more likely to choose inside lobbying strategies relative to 












3. DATA AND METHODS 
 
In this chapter I present the data collection and data analysis issues, while discussing the 
research design adopted.  
 
Several methodological alternatives are available to study lobbying strategies of interest 
groups. For example, it has been common to interview interest groups and thus go more in-
depth to explain their strategies. Previous studies have frequently focused on qualitative case 
studies (Bunea and Baumgartner 2014, 1425). However, the research questions set guidelines 
for which method(s) should be applied (George and Bennett 2005, 17). I aim to establish a 
broad and systematic understanding of the Nordic interest groups. The overall aim of the 
thesis is to tell the story about the lobbying strategies that Nordic interest groups deploy to 
influence and shape EU decision-making.  
 
To answer the research questions of this thesis, I apply a mixed methodological approach, 
combining the analysis of quantitative data and qualitative empirical evidence. I have 
constructed a built for purpose dataset that will provide information about all Nordic interest 
groups registered in the EU Transparency register. The data sources used to construct the 
original dataset is the EU Transparency Register, Lobbyfacts.eu; an online survey I 
conducted; an original dataset assembled by Adriana Bunea and Raimondas Ibenskas on 
meetings between IGs and MEPs based on the EP official website; and the media outlets 
Euractiv, Euronews and Politico.eu.  
 
The first part is a descriptive analysis, mapping the lobbying strategies of the Nordic interest 
groups. In the second part, I conduct a large-N explanatory analysis of interest groups from 
the four Nordic countries that is built on the original dataset providing information about 
interest groups’ characteristics, lobbying strategies and characteristics of policy context. 
Inside lobbying and outside lobbying is examined empirically, and my unit of observation and 
analysis is an interest group. In total I have 5 regression models for 5 variables that help me 
measure 3 dependent variables: access to the EC, access to the EP and access to media. 
Lobbying in coalitions is difficult to observe empirically. Thus, as an alternative data source, I 
have launched an online survey of Nordic interest groups identified in the Transparency 
Register in which I have asked them to respond to a set of questions pertinent for my research 
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questions. The survey answers are presented through a descriptive analysis in addition to the 





I have constructed a built for purpose dataset that provides information about all Nordic 
interest groups registered in the EU Transparency register.3 The data sources used to construct 
the original dataset is the EU Transparency Register, Lobbyfacts.eu; an online survey I 
conducted; an original dataset assembled by Adriana Bunea and Raimondas Ibenskas on 
meetings between IGs and MEPs4; and media sources such as Euractiv, Euronews and 
Politico.eu. Creating a built for purpose dataset makes it possible to identify exactly what I 
wish to study. Thus, it is important to be transparent about the operationalization of the 
variables in the dataset and the data sources (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, 113). 
 
Firstly, I have information on their organizational characteristics, gathered from the 
Transparency Register and LobbyFacts.eu. I have added data about their meetings with EC 
officials, membership in EC expert groups, number of passes to entry the European 
Parliament, resources and actor characteristics. The data from the Transparency Register and 
LobbyFacts.eu was amassed in September 2019 and later updated in January 2020 with new 
entries. I did not make changes to the already collected data but added information on interest 
groups that had been registered after September 2019. The identification is based on “Head 
office country” in the Transparency Register. A total of 803 interest groups from the Nordic 
countries were identified in the Transparency Register: 86 (10.71%) based in Norway, 186 
(23.16%) in Denmark, 264 (32.88%) in Finland and 267 (33.25%) in Sweden.  
 
The Transparency Register was created in 2008 and is a database that lists interest groups that 
try to influence the law-making and policy implementation process of the EU institutions. The 
register makes visible what interest are being pursued, by whom and with what budgets 
(European Commission 2020). The Transparency Register is managed by the Joint 
 
3 To see descriptive statistics, please turn to page 40. 
4 This original dataset was assembled as part of their collaborative joint research project exploring the 
interactions between interest groups and MEPs. The dataset was collected in relation to the ERC project 
investigating patterns of stakeholders’ participation in consultations and the effects of consultations on 
policymaking in the European Union. 
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Transparency Register Secretariat (JTRS)’ comprising staff from Parliament and the 
Commission (European Commission 2020). The Transparency Register is updated on a daily 
basis by lobbyists who submit or update their registrations every day and members of the 
JTRS study each single case individually. Although it is up to the interest groups to register in 
the Transparency Register, it is de facto mandatory to register if you want to enter the EP or 
the Commission (Bunea 2018, 2). As mentioned in Chapter 2, the EP and the Commission are 
committed to being open about the groups and organisations with which they interact, in order 
to increase their legitimacy. Accordingly, it is reasonable to assume that when interest groups 
are registered in the EU Transparency Register, they have the aim to shape and make their 
demands and preferences heard in the EU policymaking process (Bunea 2018; Greenwood 
and Dreger 2013; Greenwood and Roedere-Running 2019). 
 
 
3.1.1 Dependent variables 
 
This thesis aims to explain Nordic interest groups’ choices of different lobbying strategies. 
The conceptual section identified three lobbying strategies: inside, outside and coalitions. 
Because the dependent variable refers to various tactics, there are multiple dependent 
variables. I define inside lobbying as lobbying activities that are directly aimed at influencing 
decision-makers. I capture inside lobbying targeting the European Commission with two 
measures (IG meetings with EC high level officials and IG membership in EC expert groups) 
and inside lobbying targeting the EP with the help of two indicators (IG direct meetings with 
MEPs and Number of passes to access the EP premises).  
 
Outside lobbying is defined as lobbying activities that aim to influence policymakers through 
the public. This may happen through mobilizing constituents with press releases and 
conferences, political advertisements, contacts with journalists, protests and grassroots letter-
writing campaigns (Mahoney 2008, 9; de Bruycker and Beyers 2019, 59). “What these tactics 
share in common is that they address policymakers indirectly and are geared at raising the 
awareness of a broader audience by communicating through various forms of public media” 
(de Bruycker and Beyers 2019, 59).  
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As mentioned in the conceptualization, presence in the news media is important for interest 
groups and media strategies are considered an essential outside strategy. Therefore, I use 
media appearance of an interest group (Media access) as an indicator of a group’s attempt to 
use media as an outside lobbying strategy. Media strategies are one type of outside lobbying 
tactics; thus, media appearance (media access) alone may not necessarily equal outside 
lobbying. However, the media has become increasingly important both in the political process 
and in the strategies the interest groups pursue (Binderkrantz 2005, 695). Many scholars 
regard media access as part of an interest group’s outside strategy, but news media coverage 
itself is rarely studied (de Bruycker and Beyers 2015, 453).  
 
IG meetings with EC high levels officials captures direct access to European Commission 
officials and decision-making and is measured as a count variable indicating the number of 
meetings with the European Commission. This information is gathered from LobbyFacts.eu. 
Not only does this variable make it possible to identify which interest groups that lobby the 
Commission, but also the frequency of interest groups attending EC meetings. The number of 
meetings includes all published meetings since the 1st of December 2014. Since the 1st of 
December 2014, the European Commission has published all meetings that commissioners, 
their cabinet members and the DGs have had with interest groups registered in the 
Transparency register (LobbyFacts.eu 2020).  
 
Nevertheless, as LobbyFacts.eu (2020) state, there are a few important things to note: “A 
registrant may well have had other lobby meetings with lower-level officials in the 
Commission, but the only published data covers elite officials only. Secondly, the data that 
the Commission publishes is not perfect: there are duplications, omissions and delays. For 
example, a meeting attended by two separate officials can be reported twice, even though only 
one meeting was actually held, which can distort the figures. 
 
IG membership in EC expert groups is based on an interest group’s membership of EC 
expert groups and assembled from the Transparency Register. This captures IG access to 
European Commission as an institution and to a key part of its decision-making expert groups.  
Expert group membership is a clear indication of EU-level activity. Most likely, an interest 
group only becomes a member of such a group if it is highly active with respect to EU-level 
lobbying in the first place – if the interest group is recognised as possessing expertise (Dür 
and Mateo 2016, 171). The variable is a dummy variable where 1 is interest groups with 
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membership in EC expert groups and 0 is interest groups that do not have membership in EC 
expert groups. 
 
IG direct meetings with MEPs is measured as number of meetings with MEPs. This is a 
direct measure of access to EP legislators and the information is obtained from Bunea and 
Ibenskas’ (2020) dataset. Not all MEPs decided to publicise information about their meetings 
with IGs during July 2019 – March 2020, so Bunea and Ibenskas’ dataset only contains 
information about 200 MEPs that decided to make public information about their meetings 
with interest groups. However, this should be enough to identify some of the meetings of the 
Nordic interest groups have had with European legislators and to tells us something about the 
Nordic interest groups’ access to the MEPs. 
 
Similar to the IG membership in EC expert groups that captures access to an institution, the 
Number of passes to access the EP premises allows to capture access to the EP as an 
institution. The variable is coded as the respective interest groups’ total number of EP passes. 
EP passes means accredited badges that provides unrestricted access to the EP’s building. The 
‘EP passes’ figure, collected from the Transparency Register and LobbyFacts.eu, is an official 
figure directly from the European Parliament’s records which provides information on the 
number of accredited European Parliament passholders (LobbyFacts.eu 2020). 
 
Media access is based on media appearance over the last five years (since the 1st of January 
2014) in Euractiv, Euronews and Politico.eu – three of the most specialized EU media outlets 
(Luca 2019, 39-40). They are also the ones covering EU issues most comprehensively, hence 
IGs will most probably use these outlets to instrument and deploy outside strategies. The 
variable is measured as the total number of media appearances in the aforementioned news 
and media networks. I omitted group advertisements and Transparency Register-updates5 
because by only including articles, I am certain that the journalist or editor has been in control 
of the access (Binderkrantz et al. 2017, 313). Likewise, I excluded negative appearances as 
they cannot be regarded as a “group’s successful entrance to an arena” (Binderkrantz et al. 
2017, 313). Accordingly, constructing this variable was time consuming as I had to double 
check each and every article. 
 
5 Politico.eu publishes articles on new entries of interest groups in the Transparency Register.  
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A sentence where the IG was mentioned was taken into account as informative. However, 
some exclusions were made. Some IGs names are also a brand (such as Spotify, Nokia or 
Volvo) that is used as a concept. For example, if Spotify was mentioned I had to make sure 
that the article was about the IG and not about a Spotify playlist that someone recommended. 
I also excluded interviews on or articles about people that are/were students at a particular 
university, unless the case was about the university of some sort, as for example research.  
 
It is also worth mentioning the variation in difficulty of searching the media networks. 
Euractiv and Euronews were sensitive to verbatim searches and hence it was not complicated 
to find media appearances for the Nordic interest groups. Searching at politico.eu, on the other 
hand, was quite difficult. To be able to carry out verbatim searches at politico.eu, I ended up 
using Google instead. I searched directly in Euractiv and Euronews, but if there were “no 
findings” I also googled to make sure. The reason for searching directly in Euractiv and 
Euronews is that it gave a chronological overview of the publishing year. Furthermore, some 
interest group names are registered in the Transparency Register in a Nordic language. 
Therefore, I searched in both English and Nordic languages. This was not problematic for the 
Scandinavian interest groups, but it was less straight forward when it came to Finnish interest 
groups. In addition to searching on the IGs’ names (as they were registered in the 
Transparency Register), I also searched by abbreviations and replaced the specific 
Scandinavian vowels with digraphs or other equivalent vowels. 
 
 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics on the dependent variables of inside and outside lobbying. 
Dependent variables Minimum value Maximum value Mean Std.dev. Units (N) 
IG meetings with EC high 
level officials 
0 64 2,17 6,83 803 
IG membership in EC 
expert groups 
0 1 0,19 0,39 803 
IG direct meetings with 
MEPs 
0 1 0,15 0,35 803 
Number of passes to access 
the EP premises 
0 26 0,35 1,37 803 






3.1.2 Explanatory variables 
 
To measure resources, I have included Financial resources, Staff size and Brussels office – 
collected from the Transparency Register. Financial resources is measured as lobbying costs 
of the interest groups, that is, money spent on lobbying. The variable is recoded at an ordinal 
categorical scale ranging from 1 (costs less than 100,000 euros), 2 (costs between 100,000-
500,000 euros), 3 (costs between 500,000-1 mill euros), 4 (costs between 1 mill and 2 mill 
euros) to 5 (costs more than 2 million euros). Staff size is measured as the number of full-time 
equivalent (FTE) lobbyists. It is worth mentioning that because this figure is self-declared, it 
means that it is also subject to over- or under-reporting. Interest groups may mistakenly 
declare their total staff numbers or total membership numbers, instead of their total lobbyist 
numbers (LobbyFacts.eu 2020). Brussels office is built on “Belgium office city” from the 
Transparency Register and is recoded into a dummy variable: 1 is interest groups that have a 
Brussels office and 0 are interest groups that do not. 
 
Interest type represented is a categorical variable that differentiate between diverse types of 
interest groups and is based on the subcategories (“Subsection”) in the EU Transparency 
Register. The variable is recoded into six categories for a more concise variable, indicating for 
each interest group whether its group type corresponds to one of the following: (1) Business, 
(2) Consultancy, (3) NGO, (4) Trade union/Professional organisation, (5) Institution, (6) 
Public authority and (7) Other (Bunea 2017; Greenwood and Dreger 2013; Greenwood 2017). 
 
3.1.3 Control variables 
 
Organisational form is coded based on the “Subsection” and “Legal status” in the 
Transparency Register. If the information in those two categories was unclear, I also checked 
“Members” and/or the websites of the interest groups concerned. The variable is coded as a 
categorical variable: (1) Individual organisation (firms, NGOs, consultancies, etc.), (2) 
National association (includes firms or individuals as members and represents them as a 
national constituency, e.g. LO Norway), (3) European association (may include national 
organisations and/or firms from across EU member states and has a pan-European 
representative mandate) and (5) Other.  
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MS is EU member measures whether the interest group has its headquarters in a state that is 
an EU-member. The variable is coded a dummy variable where 1 is interest groups are based 
in Sweden, Denmark or Finland (EU-member states) and 0 is interest groups based in Norway 
(a non-EU member state). Registration year is a variable for the years the respective interest 
groups’ registration in the EU Transparency Register. This can be used as a proxy for the 
amount of experience the interest groups have in lobbying the EU institutions and 
participation in policymaking. The variable is recoded at an ordinal scale from 1 (Year 2008) 
to 13 (Year 2020). 
I have also included more information on the Nordic interest groups’ meetings with MEPs 
from Bunea and Ibenskas’ dataset about the interest groups’ relations to the MEPs they meet 
with. National vs. non-national MEPs gives us qualitative information on how many of the 
MEPs that they meet with are of same nationality as where the Nordic interest groups are 
based. 
 3.1.4 Descriptive statistics: inside and outside lobbying strategies 
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics of original dataset used to examine inside and outside 
lobbying strategies. 
Variables Minimum value Maximum value Mean Std.dev. Units (N) 
Dependent variables      




































Number of passes to access 











Media access 0 92 1,56 6,36 803 
      
Explanatory variables      
Interest type represented 1 7 2,59 1,81 803 
Financial resources 1 5 1,44 0,72 645 
Staff size 0,25 40 1,73 3,04 803 
Brussels office 0 1 0,18 0,38 803 
      
Control variables      
Organisational form 1 4 1,36 0,66 803 
MS is EU member 0 1 0,89 0,31 803 
Registration year 1 13 8,38 2,82 803 
National vs. non-national 
MEPs 
- - - - - 
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3.2 Measuring unobservable concepts 
 
In brief, more or less all concepts are unobservable, and measurement is the process of 
translating them into observable, empirically grounded indicators (Gerring 2012b, 157). The 
ambition is for the relationship between the measures to mirror the relationship between the 
concepts. Evidently it is possible to observe that interest groups meet with bureaucrats and 
European parliamentarians – such as in the Transparency Register and at LobbyFacts.eu.  
However, that an interest group has not gained access (i.e. had meetings with bureaucrats or 
policymakers) does not truly exclude the fact that this interest group might have an inside 
lobbying strategy. Put differently, access is somewhere between lobbying strategy and 
lobbying influence (Binderkrantz et al. 2017, 310). The benefit of moving from strategy to 
access is that access is observable. However, as Binderkrantz et al. (2017, 320) argue, it is 
problematic because access is controlled by relevant gatekeepers (i.e. media or policymakers) 
and not solely by the interest groups. Nonetheless, the observable implication of stakeholders 
pursuing an inside lobbying strategy is that we see that IGs are meeting with bureaucrats and 
legislators. As previously mentioned, gaining access to decision-makers is an inside lobbying 
strategy that is an exchange relation of two dimensions: (1) interest groups that seek access to 
decision-makers and (2) decision-makers give them access to them (Bouwen 2002). 
 
 
3.3 The online survey  
 
I have carried out an online survey with interest groups from the Nordic countries: Norway, 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland. As mentioned, it has been particularly common to conduct 
qualitive methods to get an in-dept understanding of interest groups’ lobbying strategies. Yet, 
because I aim to establish a broad and systematic understanding of the 803 Nordic interest 
groups registered in the Transparency Register, conducting interviews will not make that 
possible. A survey makes it possible to ask questions on which strategies interest groups are 
focusing on, which institutions are most important to them, what they regard as the most 
valuable means to reach their goal(s) and more.  
 
Nevertheless, conducting a survey is not always straightforward, as is discussed shortly. For 
example, there is a risk of not getting enough respondents to be able to make any 
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generalizations. An online survey can therefore serve as an affirmative or dismissive addition 
to the findings in the explanatory analysis of the original dataset. Here it is important to make 
it known that the online survey does not exist to illustrate the findings: in fact, it was prepared 
before an explanatory analysis was with the original dataset was conducted. Besides, 
questions in the survey were asked because it is difficult to find out otherwise.  
 
The creation of the survey and the gathering of data were conducted in the electronic tool, 
SurveyXact by Ramboll – Scandinavia’s leading survey tool. The online survey was 
distributed by e-mail and the interest groups invited to participate the online survey are the 
same interest groups included in the data set in this thesis. A total of 787 interest groups were 
invited to participate. A total of 143 participated in the online survey which means 18% of 
those that were invited. 17 out of 82 IGs from Norway, 29 out of 181 from Denmark, 58 out 
of 263 from Sweden and 39 out of 261 from Finland participated. The data collection was 
submitted to and approved by the Norwegian Centre for Research Data (NSD).  
 
 
3.3.1 The development of the online survey  
 
An online survey was created in the aim of reaching as many interest groups as possible. 
Other qualitative methods could have reduced the access to respondents, and/or taken 
unnecessary amount of time (Lohr 1999, 16). When collecting original data through a survey, 
it is important to be cautious of human error. This is reduced by conducting the survey 
electronically: the registration of data avoids human errors. However, the internal validity 
may be threatened as it is not guaranteed that the survey actually measures what it is supposed 
to. For example, measurement errors can occur if a respondent answers incorrectly – 
intentional or not. The respondents might not tell the entire truth, or they do not understand 
the questions (Lohr 1999, 9; Groves et al. 2004, 44).  
 
Moreover, question wording and order have a large effect on the answers, and certain words 
mean different things to different people (Lohr 1999, 9). The number of questions and their 
complexity are important: you do not want too many questions or for the survey to take a long 
time to answer, as it may affect measurement errors of the data (Peytchev and Peytcheva 
2017). If the survey takes too long, respondents might lose interest and stop answering. It is 
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thus important that the questionnaire and the design of the online survey is thoroughly 
developed.  
 
To supplement the dataset with information from the Transparency Register, the questions 
were based on the variables from the original dataset. Some of the questions and choice 
options were also built based on Dür and Mateo (2016). The final version contained 13 
questions. The questions were specific questions and the online survey should not take longer 
than 5 to 10 minutes.6 I decided to use closed questions (multiple choice) but added a final 
question where the respondents could share any additional insights. In a closed question, the 
respondent chooses from a set of categories. A closed question may prompt the respondent to 
remember responses that might otherwise be forgotten and is in accordance with the principle 
that specific questions are better than general ones (Lohr 1999, 12). Nevertheless, if using a 
closed question, Lohr (1999, 13) argues that one should always have an “other” category. I 
present below the outline of my online survey, which consists of 12 closed ended questions 
and 1 open ended question. 
 
The survey was distributed on the 3rd of February through e-mail to the interest groups. The e-
mail addresses were collected through the interest groups’ websites: preferably the head of 
EU affairs. In that way I could be sure that the survey was sent to a person who could answer 
for the interest group. Nonetheless, if the interest group did not have contact information 
available through the website, I contacted either the general contact email or to the head of the 
interest group. I found 788 e-mails out of 804, and thus 16 interest groups did not get the 
invitation to participate. 
 
In the invitation e-mail I asked the respondents to kindly answer the survey by the 3rd of 
March. I sent out a reminder on the 17th of February. Until the 2nd of March there were 139 
interest groups who had participated. Due to fewer responses than desired, I extended the 
deadline to the 15th of March and sent out a final reminder on the 2nd of March. One of the 
reasons for doing this was that it had been winter holidays in the Nordic countries, and thus I 
expected to receive more responses if I extended the deadline. Due to the corona virus it is 
hard to say if there could have been more, but 8 interest groups participated after the final 
reminder.   
 
6 According to the details in SurveyXact, no interest group spent more than 10 minutes to answer the survey. 
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3.3.2 The questionnaire 
 
1) What is the name of your organisation?  
_____ 
2) What is the type of interest by your organisation? 
 q Business 
 q Consultancy 
 q Public interest org./NGO 
 q Professional org. 
 q Trade union 
 q Public authority 
 q Other (if yes, please indicate which) _____ 
3) What is your organisation’s country of origin? 
_____ 
 
4) Does your organisation have an office in Brussels? 
 q Yes 
 q No 
5) How often does your organisation use the following strategies to participate in and influence EU 
decision-making and legislation? 
 Once a year About 2-5 times a year 
About 6-9 
times a year 
About 10-15 
times a year 
On a weekly 
basis 
Direct contacts with policymakers 
and/or public officials  q  q  q q q 
Participating in the European 
Commission's open consultations  q  q  q  q q 
Distributing a press release q q q q q 
Using social media campaigns 
(Twitter, Facebook, etc.)  q  q  q  q  q 
 
6) What is your organisation’s main approach to lobby EU institutions and policymaking? 
 q Work alone 
 q Lobby as part of a European federation 
 q Lobby as part of ad hoc coalitions 
 q Lobby with the help of a public consultancy firm 
 q Other (if yes, please indicate how) _____ 
 
 
7) When attempting to shape EU legislation and decision-making, where is your organisation most likely 
to lobby? 
 q At national level, targeting/talking to national governments and/or responsible ministries 
 q In Brussels, targeting/talking to the national permanent representation 
 q In Brussels, targeting the EU institutions 




8) Please indicate which of the following EU institutions is the main target of your organisation’s attempt 
to communicate with EU decision-makers 
 q European Commission 
 q European Parliament 
 q European Council 
 q Regulatory agencies 
 q The Committee of Regions 
 q Economic and Social committee 
 q Other (if yes, please indicate which) _____ 
 
 
9) Please rank the following three institutions based on their importance for your attempts to shape EU 
legislation: 
 Not important at all Moderately important Highly important 
European Commission  q  q  q 
European Parliament  q  q  q 
European Council  q  q  q 
 
 
10) How difficult do you find it to approach the following EU institution? 
 Very difficult Somewhat difficult Easy 
European Commission  q  q  q 
European Parliament  q  q  q 
European Council  q  q  q 
 
 
11) Which of the following organisational resources inform and determine your choice of lobbying 
strategies targeting EU institutions and decision-making? 
 q Financial resources 
 q Staff resources 
 q Processing the right information and policy expertise 
 q Other organisational resources, please name _____ 
 
 
12) Which lobbying strategy is in your view most likely to lead to lobbying success and policy influence 
when attempting to shape EU decision-making? 
 q Direct contacts with policymakers and/or public officials 
 q Participating in the European Commission's open consultations 
 q Distributing a press release 
 q Using social media campaigns (Twitter, Facebook, etc.) 
 q Other (please indicate which) _____ 
 
13) Please let me know if you would like to share any additional insights about your experience of 
participating in EU policymaking and engaging with EU decisionmakers. I would be grateful for your 






3.3.3 Reflections and limitations of the online survey 
 
In hindsight, there are some changes I would like to have made in the questionnaire. Firstly, 
question number five asking “How often does your organisation use the following strategies 
to participate in and influence EU decision-making and legislation?”. It was initially the plan 
to have a “never”-option, but somewhere in the process I decided to remove it. The reason for 
this was that people tend to press “never” because they are in a rush or do not remember. As 
the respondents may hurry through the survey and answer incorrectly, it may lead to low 
internal validity for the survey answers. Nevertheless, it should have been included a “not 
applicable”-option.  
 
I received an e-mail from one of the respondents who told me that this question was not 
applicable for them and that because they had to answer the question they had to choose 
“once a year”. Luckily, I received this e-mail shortly after the distribution and up until that 
point, no one besides this specific interest group had chosen “once a year”. I adjusted the 
settings and made it possible to choose not to answer the question and/or alternatives at all. 
However, I am not sure how visible this was. Thus, it is important to keep in mind that “once 
a year” can also mean less or never. Fortunately, it is not a decisive problem to convert “once 
a year” into “once a year or less” in the thesis.  
 
A potential problem of distributing the survey through e-mail is that some interest groups may 
not have received the invitation to participate. Some e-mails may have not made it through 
due to spam filters. Or it could be the opposite: the interest groups receive too many similar 
requests and therefore do not wish to participate. Another potential setback is that some 
interest groups argue that they do not engage in lobbying activities and thus do not wish to 
participate in the survey. As briefly mentioned in the conceptualization part of the thesis, 
there are confusions on the concept of lobbying. Some interest groups (that do lobby 
according to the definition applied in the thesis) do not want to be associated with this term. 
There may also be other confusions that led to not participating. Lastly, and probably the most 






3.3.4 Descriptive statistics: lobbying in coalitions 
 
As previously mentioned, lobbying in coalitions is difficult to observe empirically. Question 6 
in the online survey was asked to see whether Nordic interest groups largely work alone, part 
of coalitions (either European federations or ad hoc coalitions) or with the help of 
consultancies. The results are discussed in chapter 4 through both a descriptive and 
explanatory analysis. The explanatory analysis consists of Lobbying in coalitions as the 
dependent variable, in addition to the same explanatory and control variables from the 
original dataset.  
 
Lobbying in coalitions is a dummy variable where 1 is interest groups who answered that 
lobbying coalitions is their main approach to lobby the EU institutions and policymaking. 
Lobbying in coalitions include lobbying as part of European federations and/or ad hoc 
coalitions. Interest groups who work alone, with the help of consultancies or other approaches 
that is not considered coalition behaviour, are measured as 0. Table 3.3 shows the descriptive 
statistics for the dataset used to explain why interest groups lobby in coalitions.  
 
 
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of original dataset used to examine the strategy of lobbying in 
coalitions. 
Variables Minimum value Maximum value Mean Std.dev. Units (N) 
Dependent variables      
Lobbying in coalitions 0 1 0,75 0,44 143 
Explanatory variables      
Interest type represented 1 7 3,50 1,75 143 
Staff size 0,25 30 2,51 4,18 143 
Brussels office 0 1 0,29 0,46 143 
      
Control variables      
Organisational form 1 4 1,52 0,74 143 
EU-membership 0 1 0,88 0,32 143 






3.4 Descriptive analysis 
 
The overall theme and research questions are formulated in a way that emphasize descriptive 
analysis in addition to establish whether there are causal relationships. The literature on 
interest groups in Brussels have largely been descriptive studies (Bunea and Baumgartner 
2014, 1425). First and foremost, there is no complete mapping of all Nordic interest groups 
trying to influence EU policymaking - and descriptive statistics are well suited when mapping 
unknown information. Therefore, the first part of the thesis identifies these groups: how many 
are they, what are they interested in and what types of interest groups are they? This 
information is obtained via the Transparency Register and LobbyFacts.eu. 
 
A descriptive argument aims to answer what questions, and, by contrast, causal arguments 
attempt to answer why questions (Gerring 2012a, 723). Gerring (2012a) argues that causality 
and description are intimately related; one cannot be understood without the other. His 
perspective is that the terms causal and descriptive should be understood as forms of 
argumentation, not as characterizations of the sort of evidence available for causal inference 
(Gerring 2012a, 724). 
 
Over the last decades, there has been an increasingly focus on causal analysis and less on 
description (Gerring 2012a, 730; Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, 56). Gerring (2012a, 733) 
argues that if description only happens in the quest for causal inference, the causal motivation 
of researchers may mitigate both the quality and the quantity of descriptive inferences. “We 
will know less about the world (descriptively) and what we know will be less precise, less 
reliable and perhaps subject to systematic bias – generated by scholar’s motivation to uncover 
a causal relationship” (Gerring 2012a, 733).  
 
Nevertheless, description may be of little importance if it is not linked to causal relationships. 
Similarly, we cannot construct good causal explanations without solid descriptions (King, 
Keohane and Verba 1994, 34). Therefore, identifying the underlying factors for the interest 
groups' choice of lobbying strategies is also important and complements the descriptive part. 
Furthermore, King, Keohane and Verba (1994, 37) argue for the importance of understanding 
the subject under investigation: only through an understanding of a subject can one ask the 
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right questions and hypotheses. The conceptualization of key concepts and review on existing 
theories and empirical findings have resulted in the hypotheses in Chapter 2.  
 
 
3.5 Mixed methods 
 
The aim of the study determines the choice of method: whether it is to generalize, explain the 
extent to which something affects an outcome or explain why something happens. Here, 
different methods have different assumptions - and as Curry (2017, 114) argues "different 
approaches can yield different insights". 
 
If the goal is to generalize and be able to say something about how much an independent 
variable influences an outcome (dependent variable), a quantitative method is better suited. 
On the other hand, if one wants to go deeper into a case and explain why it happened, some 
would reason that qualitative method is better suited. Whichever method one chooses, there 
will be strengths and weaknesses. Qualitative methods make it possible to search deeply into 
one or several cases and to understand why something is happening. However, it can be 
difficult to generalize to a population. James Johnson (2006), though, argues that it is not 
necessarily a weakness, because the goal will not always be to generalize. Quantitative 
methods, on the other hand, make it possible to estimate the effect of a cause and to generalize 
to the population. At the same time, measurement errors can occur, and one cannot really say 
why a particular effect is the way it is. Because there are both strengths and weaknesses in 
both methods, several researchers have paved the way for multiple methods to be used 
simultaneously.  
 
The use of mixed methods has increased in social science research (Lieberman 2005). The 
term is a general term in nature and applies to multiple and different methods that have been 
used to answer a research question (Goertz 2016, 4). Properly used, several methods can both 
triangulate the findings as well as to bring new information to the analysis (Rohlfing 2008, 
1493; Lieberman 2015, 240). As Ragin (1987) argues, the use of a multi-method design 
should make it possible to complement the strengths of the different methods and thus make 
up for any weaknesses. Nonetheless, some would rather say it is easier said than done. 
Rohlfing (2008) points out that it is difficult to do just one method correctly, so using multiple 
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methods can be difficult. Therefore, to avoid as much bias as possible, it is important to be 
transparent (Kellstedt and Whitten 2018, 113). 
 
I intend to get a broad perspective on Nordic interest groups’ lobbying strategies. 
Nevertheless, I am open to alternative explanations that I cannot account for in the analysis 
with my built for purpose dataset. Additional data and analysis might make up for that. The 
advantage of using two methods to gather data is that the combination of both forms of data 
provides a better understanding of the phenomenon that is studied by providing more detailed 
and specific information than using a quantitative or qualitative method alone.   
 
 
3.6 Data analysis methods 
 
Because the dependent variables are measured differently, separate methods are required to 
analyse the data. More precisely, the three count variables require negative binomial 
regression and the three dummy variables demand logistic regression. Below I present and 
discuss these methods. 
 
3.6.1 Negative binomial regression 
 
Three of the dependent variables are numeric count variables: IG meetings with EC high level 
officials, Number of passes to access the EP premises and Media access. Count variables are 
usually overdispersed, which means that the variance is greater than the mean and that the 
distribution of count outcomes is skewed (Hilbe 2014, 9). All three count variables in this 
thesis are overdispersed. There are many zeros for the three variables: for example, there are 
many zeros for IG meetings with EC high level officials, strictly because many interest groups 
do not meet with EC high level officials. At the same time, one interest group has had 64 
meetings with EC high level officials. This indicates that the variance exceeds the conditional 
mean. The respective variances are several times the mean for all the three count variables. 
Since the standard errors in a linear regression are based on the assumption that the variance 
is equal to the mean, this creates a problem. It is therefore appropriate to apply a method that 
takes count data and overdispersion into account. A common method for dealing with count 
data and overdispersion is the negative binomial regression model (Hilbe 2014, 10). 
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Because there is a high number of zero counts on the dependent variables, an option would be 
to use a zero-inflated negative binomial model which changes the mean structure by allowing 
zeros to be generated by two distinct processes (Rasmussen and Alexandrova 2012, 620). 
Despite the high number of zeros in the dataset, I rely on a negative binomial model for the 
regressions with these three dependent variables. It is not theoretically clear which substantive 
factor(s) predict whether an IG always (or sometimes) has the value of zero. For example, 
although there is theory arguing that there are specific factors that matter for inside lobbying 
strategy (and thus why some IGs do not rely on inside strategies), it does not mean that inside 
lobbying strategy equals meetings with the EC high level officials. Meetings with EC high 
level officials represents one type of inside lobbying strategy. There might be interest groups 
that rely on inside lobbying strategies other than meetings with the EC high level officials. 
 
“Negative binomial regression is similar to regular multiple regression except that the 
dependent (Y) variable is an observed count that follows the negative binomial distribution. 
Thus, the possible values of Y are the nonnegative integers: 0, 1, 2, 3, and so on” (NCSS 
Statistical Software 2020). Negative binomial regression can be considered a generalization of 
Poisson regression (NCSS Statistical Software 2020). Poisson regression is often used for 
modelling count data, while negative binomial regression is useful for count data that are 
overdispersed. Negative binomial regression has the same mean structure as Poisson 
regression, but it has an extra parameter to model the overdispersion: it loosens the restrictive 
assumption that the variance is equal to the mean made by the Poisson model (NCSS 
Statistical Software 2020; Hilbe 2014, 129). If the conditional distribution of the outcome 
variable is overdispersed, the confidence intervals for the negative binomial regression are 
likely to be narrower as compared to those from a Poisson regression model. Negative 
binomial regression thus takes care of overdispersion by predicting that there will be 
unexplained variability between entities with the same predicted value (Hilbe 2014, 10-11).  
 
 
3.6.2 Logistic regression 
 
The three remaining dependent variables are dummy variables: IG membership in EC expert 
groups, IG direct meetings with MEPs and Lobbying in coalitions. Because the variables are 
dichotomous and thus non-linear, I apply logistic regression in the analysis (Skog 2015, 352). 
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Logistic regression, also called a logit model, is most often used to model dichotomous 
outcome variables. “In the log odds of the outcome is modelled as a linear combination of the 
predictor variables” (IDRE 2020).  
 
An assumption of logistic regression is that the binary outcome has a curvilinear S-shaped 
relationship (Skog 2015, 354;380). The form of the regression curve can be calculated 
statistically by using the Hosmer Lemeshow test. A significant test means that there are 
significant differences between actual and predicted values, and that the model is not S-
shaped (Skog 2015, 381). The curvilinear regression assumption is fulfilled as none of the 
binary variables in this thesis have a significant Hosmer Lemeshow test.   
 
 
3.6.3 Addressing multicollinearity   
 
Another important assumption that is important for both negative binomial regression and 
logistic regression is absence of multicollinearity – i.e. independent variables are not 
correlated with each other. High multicollinearity makes it difficult to calculate the size of the 
individual coefficients (Midtbø 2012, 128).  
 
Financial resources is highly correlated with Staff Size (corr: 0,55 p<0,05). Because there are 
only 645 observations for Financial resources, I find it appropriate to only rely on Staff size 
and Brussels office to measure material resources in my models. Nevertheless, one could 
argue that Financial resources captures the notion of Staff size as material resources (Dür and 
Mateo 2013, 684).  
 
After running the regressions, I checked for multicollinearity with a variance inflation factor 
(VIF) test. VIF scores above 10 are often considered problematic (Midtbø 2012, 129). For all 
models, all variables have values between 1 and 2, which is well below the tolerance level of 








In this chapter I present the empirical analyses. The first part of the chapter is a descriptive 
analysis, mapping the lobbying strategies of the Nordic interest groups identified in the 
Transparency Register. In the second part, I conduct a large-N explanatory analysis on inside 
and outside lobbying strategies of interest groups from the four Nordic countries by 
examining the original dataset providing information about interest groups’ characteristics, 
lobbying strategies and characteristics of policy context. As an additional data source, I have 
gathered data through an online survey, where Nordic interest groups identified in the EU 
Transparency Register responded to a set of questions pertinent to my research questions. I 
analyse the data from the online survey employing both descriptive and explanatory analyses. 
 
 
4.1 Descriptive analysis of the Nordic interest groups 
 
The Transparency Register was created in 2008 and is a database that lists interest groups that 
participate and try to shape the decision-making processes in the EU institutions. Figure 4.1 
shows that in 2008 there were only 19 Nordic interest groups registered, but that the number 













2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Figure 4.1: Annual increase in number of registered interest groups in the Transparency Register.  
Sources: The Transparency Register and LobbyFacts.eu. 
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A total of 803 Nordic interest groups were identified in the Transparency Register between 
September 2019 when I started the data collection and March 2020 when I ended the data 
collection for my research. Nordic interest groups are interest groups with head offices in 
Norway, Denmark, Sweden or Finland. As shown in Figure 4.2, there are 86 (10.71%) interest 
groups based in Norway, 186 (23.16%) in Denmark, 264 (32.88%) in Finland and 267 














4.1.1 Organisational characteristics 
 
These interest groups represent various interests. Nevertheless, Figure 4.3 shows that almost 
half of all Nordic interest groups (47%) represent business. NGOs are the second largest 









Figure 4.2: Nordic interest groups registered in the EU Transparency Register, by nationality. 















Figure 4.3: Interest types represented by Nordic interest groups. 
Sources: The Transparency Register and LobbyFacts.eu. 
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Figure 4.4 shows that the same pattern describes the individual country profile in terms of 
type of interest groups joining the Transparency Register. Business actors are the most 
numerous among all the Nordic interest groups, whereas NGOs the second most present 
category. Arbitrary examples of Nordic business actors registered in the Transparency 
Register include Agder Energi, Asetek, Elekta AB and the Enevo Oy. Forbrukerrådet (NCC), 
Det Økologiske Råd (Ecocouncil), Barncancerfonden and Finnish Beekeepers’ Association 




The figure reveals, however, some differences between the interest groups located in the four 
Nordic countries. Firstly, the Swedish, Danish and Finnish interest groups are relatively 
homogenous – with some minor differences in the percentage proportion of the various 
interest types represented. For example, Finnish and Danish interest groups consist of more 
trade unions/professional organisations than Swedish interest groups. Furthermore, the figure 
indicates that the constellation of Norwegian interest groups participating in the EU 
policymaking is somewhat different: the percentage of public authorities and institutions are 
larger for Norwegian interest groups, compared to the other Nordic countries. This is not 
necessarily crucial when comparing the Nordic countries, as the total number of Norwegian 
interest groups in the Transparency Register is considerably lower. It is nevertheless of 
significance that a distinctive proportion of Norwegian interest groups are institutions (e.g. 
Norwegian University of Sciences and Technology) and public authorities (e.g. 
Osloregionen).  
Figure 4.4: Frequency distribution of interest type represented by Nordic interest groups, per country. 






Figure 4.5 presents the frequency distribution of interest groups by organisational form across 
all Nordic interest groups per country. It shows that 71% of the Nordic interest groups are 
individual organisations. As expected, there are very few European associations based in the 
Nordic countries (e.g. European forest Nurseries Association and Europe’s People’s Forum), 
and 25% are national associations. The fact that 25% of the Nordic interest groups are 
national associations is not surprising, given the corporatist background of the countries. It is 
also evident that a higher percentage of interest groups from Denmark and Finland are 
national associations, compared to the Norwegian and Swedish interest groups. Moreover, as 
shown in Figure 4.6, the majority of the national associations represent business. As a matter 
of fact, 140 out of 381 business groups are national associations (e.g. Danske Maritime and 
the Norwegian Wind Energy Association). Additionally, 57 out of 63 trade 
unions/professional organisations are national associations (e.g. The Central Organisation of 
Finnish Trade Unions SAK).  
 
 
Figure 4.5: Frequency distribution of organisational form of the Nordic interest groups. 































Individual National European Other
Figure 4.7: Nordic interest groups having a Brussels office. 
Sources: The Transparency Register and LobbyFacts.eu. 
Figure 4.6: Frequency distribution of organisational form of the Nordic interest groups, 
by interest type represented. Sources: The Transparency Register and LobbyFacts.eu. 
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Figure 4.7 gives an overview of the amount of interest groups that have an office in Brussels. 
In total, 659 out of 803 Nordic interest groups (82%) have Brussels offices. Having a Brussels 
office is an indicator of resources, and the literature suggests that being situated in Brussels 
enhances the chances of getting close to EU policymaking (Mahoney 2004, 453; Bunea 2014, 
1229; Bouwen 2002, 374). That so many Nordic interest groups have Brussels offices is 
therefore quite noteworthy, though, expected from interest groups that is registered in the 
Transparency Register. It is expected because we assume that interest groups registered in the 
Transparency Register, are actively aiming to influence the EU policymaking process, and 
thus have a Brussels office to increase their chances of influence. Furthermore, taking the 
differentiated integration of the Nordic countries into account, the distinctions in the 
percentages per country are also as expected: 73% of the Norwegian interest groups have a 
Brussels office, 79% of the Danish and Swedish interest groups have Brussels offices, 
whereas as much as 90% of the Finnish interest groups have a Brussels office. 
 
Having financial resources is important for interest groups: monetary assets lead to better 
hires and expertise, and a higher ability to secure a greater number of direct meetings with a 
diversity of policymakers. As stated in Chapter 3, the Financial resources-variable is perhaps 
not the most indicative measure of financial resources, as it actually measures lobbying 
expenses (i.e. how much they invest in lobbying activities) and not budget. Nonetheless, 
lobbying costs provide useful information. The variable exhibits that 430 interest groups, 
which constitute more than half of the Nordic interest groups, spend less than 100,000 euros 
on lobbying activities. 160 interest groups spend between 100,000-500,000 euros, and 42 
interest groups spend between 500,000 euros and 1 million. Only 11 interest groups spend 
more than 1 million euros and only two interest groups spend over 2 million. The same 
pattern is also true when looking at staff size: most interest groups are small in size (the mean 
of FTE is 1.73). This is also the case when examining the individual countries. Consequently, 
regarding financial resources and staff size, the data reveal that most of the Nordic interest 
groups are small and financially resource-poor organisations. Still, there are some interest 








Table 4.1: The Nordic interest groups (IGs) identified in the Transparency Register that 
spends the most on lobbying activities. 
 Norwegian IGs Danish IGs Swedish IGs Finnish IGs 
Lobbying 
expenses in euros 
    
Lobbying costs 
over 5 million 
Equinor  Kreab  
Lobbying costs 
over 2 million 
 Confederation of 
Danish Industry 
(DI) 
Ericsson Finnish Energy - 
Energiateollisuus ry (ET) 






























Sources: Transparency Register and LobbyFacts.eu. 
 
 
Table 4.1 gives an overview of the interest groups from the Nordic countries lobbying in 
Brussels that spend the most on lobbying activities. These interest groups use over 2 million 
euros on lobbying activities, and Equinor and Kreab spend more than 5 million euros. Six of 
them are business groups (Equinor, DI, FiDa, Reform Society, Ericsson and Finnish Energy), 
whereas Coompanion and Pro-tukipiste ry are NGOs, SALAR, Region Skåne and GCPHEU 
are public authorities, STTK is a trade union/professional organisation and Kreab is a 
consultancy. Most of them are individual organisations, while four of them are national 
associations (DI, Finance Denmark, Finnish Energy, STTK). Moreover, 10 out of 13 have a 
Brussels office – only Reform Society, Coompanion and STTK do not have a Brussels office. 
Regarding staff size, most of the groups have a large staff size (the mean of FTE is 12). These 
are thus large interest groups with considerable resources, and regarding H1, one should 
expect that they directly lobby bureaucrats and/or legislators. However, considering that they 
represent different interest types, it is unclear whether interest type represented matter for 
inside lobbying – which is what H3 proposes. 
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4.1.2 Lobbying strategies 
 
Inside lobbying targeting the European Commission  
 
Inside lobbying strategies entail communicating directly to bureaucrats and/or legislators 
(Mahoney 2008, 9). It is of particular interest to identify which lobbying strategies the interest 
groups choose, given the organisational characteristics of the Nordic interest groups described 
above. The dataset reveals that 258 of 803 interest groups (32%) have had one or more 
meetings with the Commission and thus employed an inside lobbying strategy aimed at the 
European executive. Still, the majority of the Nordic interest groups have never had such 
meetings. As shown in Table 4.2, the maximum number of meetings with EC high level 
officials is 64, but the average number of meetings is 2.2 for all the Nordic interest groups. 
However, the median is 0 for all Nordic interest groups together, as well as for each 
individual country. This implies that the number of interest groups that meet with EC high 
level officials, in addition to the number of meetings, are quite skewed among the Nordic 
interest groups. Only a few Nordic interest groups have frequent meetings with EC high level 
officials. See Appendix A for an overview of the ten interest groups per Nordic country that 
most frequently meet with EC high level officials. 
 
The dataset indicates that, respectively, 28% of the Danish and Swedish interest groups have 
had meetings with EC high level officials. For example, Danish Energy has had 8 meetings 
and Lantbrukarnas Riksförbund (LRF) has had 12 meetings. The maximum number of 
meetings with EC high level officials for the Danish interest groups is 27, while the maximum 
number for Swedish interest groups is 59. Likewise, the average number of meetings for 
Swedish interest groups is 2.0, whereas the average number of meetings is 1,6 for Danish 
interest groups. This means that Swedish interest groups meet more frequently with EC high 
level officials than Danish interest groups. Yet, the standard deviation of 7.4 tells us that there 
are only a few Swedish interest groups that have many meetings, whereas the standard 
deviation for Danish interest groups is only 4.1. 
 
Moreover, 20 of the 86 Norwegian interest groups (23%) have had meetings with EC high 
level officials. Moreover, there are some Norwegian interest groups that have had several 
meetings with EC high level officials. For instance, Statnett, NTNU and Confederation of 
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Norwegian Enterprise (NHO) all have had 12 meetings each. Nonetheless, the average 
number of meetings with EC high level officials is 1.8 for Norwegian interest groups. This 
could have implied that Norwegian interest groups meet more frequently with EC high level 
officials compared to Danish interest groups. However, the average is influenced by an 
outlier: Equinor has had 46 meetings with EC high level officials. 
 
A total of 42% of the Finnish interest groups have had meetings with EC high level officials – 
a high percentage compared to the other Nordic interest groups. Furthermore, the maximum 
number of meetings is 64 and the average number of meetings is 2.8. This means that many 
Finnish interest groups meet frequently with EC high level officials, compared to the other 
Nordic interest groups. This is expected, though, given that Finland is considered as being 
close to the core of EU activity (Mouritzen and Wivel 2005, 95). Notwithstanding, the 
standard deviation is 7.9, which tells us that there are some Finnish interest groups that meet a 
lot more frequently than other Finnish interest groups. 
 
Table 4.2: Univariate summary statistics for IG meetings with EC high level officials. 








Min 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 64 46 27 59 64 
Average 2.2 1.8 1.6 2.0 2.8 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 
St. dev. 6.8 5.9 4.1 7.4 7.9 
N 803 86 186 267 264 
 
79 of the Nordic interest groups have had more than 5 meetings (i.e. less than 10% of the total 
number of Nordic interest groups identified in the Transparency Register). Fewer have had 
more than 20 meetings: more specifically, only 19 interest groups have had more than 20 
meetings with EC high level officials. 8 of them are Finnish interest groups, 7 of them 
Swedish, 3 of them Danish and 1 of them Norwegian.  
 
Equinor has had 46 meetings with EC high level officials, and is the only Norwegian interest 
group that has had over 20 meetings. Confederation of Danish Industry (DI) and Landbrug & 
Fødevarer – Danish Agriculture and Food Council (DAFC) are the two among Danish interest 
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groups with the most meetings with EC high level officials, respectively 27 and 20 meetings. 
The two Finnish interest groups with the highest number of meetings with EC high level 
officials are Confederation of Finnish Industries EK (EK), who has had 64 meetings, and 
Nokia who has had 55 meetings. Kreab and Spotify AB are the two Swedish interest groups 
with most frequent meetings with EC high level officials, individually 59 and 55 meetings.  
 
The shared trait of the 19 interest groups exceeding 20 meetings is that they largely represent 
business, as 16 out of 19 are business groups. One is consultancy, another is a trade 
union/public organisation and the last one is an institution. Furthermore, six of them are 
national associations and the rest individual organisations. When it comes to resources, 8 of 
them spend more than 500,000 euros in lobbying expenses; 11 out of 19 interest groups have 
more than 3 in FTE; and 14 out of 19 have a Brussels office. In other words, what 
characterises interest groups with 20 meetings or more with EC high level officials, is that 
they are business groups and resource-rich. Interest groups with no meetings are characterised 
by small staff sizes, no Brussels offices, lobbying expenses under 100,000 euros and a variety 
of group types and organisational forms. With H1 and H3 in mind, it does seem that 
especially business groups, that are also resource-rich groups, rely on inside lobbying 
strategies – which in this case is direct meetings with EC high level officials.  
 
Another inside lobbying strategy targeting the Commission is membership in EC expert 
groups. A total of 151 out of 803 of the Nordic interest groups (19%) are members of various 
EC expert groups. For example, Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise, Confederation of 
Danish Industry (DI), Confederation of Finnish Industries EK and Confederation of Swedish 
Enterprise have memberships. As presented in Figure 4.8. Swedish interest groups have the 
highest number of organisations that are members in expert groups with a percentage of 38, 
followed by the Finnish (25%) and Danish (23%) interest groups from the total of interest 
groups analysed in this thesis. A particular interesting finding is that Norwegian interest 
groups constitute 21 of the total number (14%). This means that 21 out of 86 of the 
Norwegian interest groups (24%) have membership in EC expert groups. As shown in the 
Figure 4.8, this percentage is larger compared to the other Nordic countries. See Appendix B 
for a full list of Norwegian interest groups with membership in EC expert groups and which 






The fact that 24% of Norwegian interest groups are members of EC expert groups, tells us 
that many of the Norwegian interest groups are very active in lobbying in Brussels (Dür and 
Mateo, 171). This is also to be expected when they are registered in the Transparency 
Register. Regardless, the participation of numerous Norwegian interest groups is crucial as 
bureaucrats and politicians rely heavily on technical issues in the early stages of the 
policymaking process (Chalmers 2014, 976). Bernhagen and Mitchell (2009) argue that 
Norwegian companies compensate for lack of representation in EU institutions by inside 
lobbying in Brussels. This looks to be the case for Norwegian interest groups in general, both 
when it comes to meetings with EC high level officials and memberships in EC expert groups.   
 
The characteristics of the interest groups that have membership in EC expert groups are 
diverse. Firstly, the vast majority constitutes individual organisations. Secondly, 44% of them 
are business groups, 23% of them are NGOs, 13% are institutions, 11% are trade 
unions/professional organisations, 6% are public authorities and consultancies and other make 
up the rest of the 3%. This indicates that interest groups with membership in EC expert groups 
do not exclusively compose of business groups, but other types as well. Although most of the 
interest groups that have memberships are business groups, they also constitute a larger 
number in total in the Transparency Register. Therefore, it is not clear whether business 
groups are more likely to have EC expert group memberships.  
 
Figure 4.8: Nordic interest groups with EC expert group membership. Total distribution to the left and 
distribution of membership per country to the right. Sources: The Transparency Register and 
LobbyFacts.eu. 
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Furthermore, it does not look like financial resources matter when it comes to EC expert 
group membership. For example, only 8 out of the 19 interest groups having had 20 meetings 
or more with EC high level officials, have membership in EC expert groups. The vast 
majority of the Nordic interest groups that are members of EC expert groups spend less than 
100,000 euros on lobbying activities. Regarding staff size it is very diverse: some have a large 
FTE, while others do not. What is most surprising, however, is that most of the interest groups 
with membership in EC expert groups do not have a Brussels office. In fact, almost 80% of 
the interest groups that have memberships in EC expert groups do not have Brussels offices. 
Consequently, it remains unclear whether resource-rich groups actually are more likely to 
have EC expert group memberships. According to this, it is difficult to tell whether H1 and 
H3 are supported when it comes to EC expert group membership.  
 
 
Inside lobbying strategies targeting the European Parliament 
 
To analyse inside lobbying strategies targeting the European Parliament, I look at the number 
of passes to access the EP premises and whether interest groups have had direct meetings with 
MEPs or not. The data discloses that not many interest groups have EP passes: only 109 of 
803 Nordic interest groups (14%) applied for and were issued passes to enter the EP premises. 
Most interest groups have only one pass, but there are also some with several passes. For 
example, Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO), Danish Shipping, Swedish Forest 
Industries Federation and Elisa Oyj all have 3 EP passes each. Only nine interest groups have 
five or more passes. For instance, the Norwegian interest group Bellona Europe has 6 EP 
passes, Faglig Fælles Forbund (3F) has 5 EP passes, the Confederation of Swedish Enterprise 
has 5 EP passes and Chemical Industry Federation of Finland (Kemianteollisuus ry) (CIFF) 
has 9 EP passes.  
 
According to Table 4.3, 14% of all the Norwegian interest groups have passes. Given that 
Norway is not a member of the EU, there is actually a quite high percentage of Norwegian 
interest groups that have EP passes, compared to the other interest groups. Respectively, 17 
and 18% of Danish and Swedish interest groups have EP passes, while only 9,8% of Finnish 




Table 4.3: Frequency distribution of interest groups with EP passes, per country 
Number of EP passes Norwegian IGs Danish IGs Swedish IGs Finnish IGs 
0 74 155 227 238 
1 6 13 16 10 
2 2 4 10 6 
3 3 6 5 5 
4  4 6 4 
5  2 1  
6 1 1   
9  1 1 1 
26   1  
Total number of interest groups 86 186 267 264 
Interest groups with EP passes 12 31 40 26 
Percentage with EP passes 14% 17% 18% 9,8% 
Sources: The Transparency Register and LobbyFacts.eu. 
 
What characterises the Nordic interest groups that have EP passes is that the large majority 
constitutes of business groups. Moreover, almost 60% of the interest groups with EP passes 
have a Brussels office. The interest group with the most EP passes, however, is the Swedish 
interest group Kreab. Kreab has 26 EP passes, is a consultancy, has an FTE of 30, spends over 
2 million euros in lobbying expenses and has a Brussels office. Though the correlation 
between resources and number of EP passes seem to be evident when it comes to Kreab, this 
is not the case for the three interest groups that have 9 EP passes (the second largest number 
of EP passes). The Swedish interest group SKF, the Danish interest group Confederation of 
Danish Industry (DI) and the Finnish interest group Chemical Industry Federation of Finland 
(Kemianteollisuus ry) (CIFF) all have 9 EP passes each. SKF and the Confederation of 
Danish Industry (DI) have a Brussels office, while Chemical Industry Federation of Finland 
(Kemianteollisuus ry) (CIFF) does not. Furthermore, Confederation of Danish Industry (DI) 
spends over 1 million euros in lobbying expenses, while the two other interest groups spend 
less than 100,000 euros. They also differ quite a bit in staff size. What they have in common, 
however, is that they all represent business. With the hypotheses in mind, it thus seems that 





Figure 4.9 shows that there are slightly more interest groups that have had meetings with 
MEPs, than interest groups that have EP passes. 118 out of 803 Nordic interest groups (15%) 
have met with MEPs. It is evident that Finnish IGs lobby through meetings with MEPs: as 
many as 40% of Finnish interest groups registered in the Transparency Register have had 
meetings with MEPs. The same is applicable to the Swedish interest groups where 35% have 
met with MEPs. Danish interest groups meet MEPs less frequently, only 18% of all Danish 
groups analysed have met with MEPs. Moreover, 9 Norwegian interest groups have had 
meetings with MEPs – which accounts for only 7% of the Norwegian interest groups. These 
nine Norwegian interest groups include Norsk Hydro, Statkraft AS, Landsorganisasjonen i 
Norge (LO-Norway), Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise (NHO), Energi Norge (Energy 
Norway), Equinor ASA (EQNR), North Norway European Office (NNEO), Schibsted ASA, 
as well as European Huntington Association, a European association based in Norway.  
 
Similarly to interest groups with EP passes, what characterises the Nordic interest groups that 
have had direct meetings with MEPs is that they largely comprise of business groups. 60% of 
interest groups that have had direct meetings with MEPs are business groups, while 14% are 
NGOs. Trade unions, institutions and public authorities constitute about 7-8% each, while 
consultancies and “other” the last 4%. Approximately 62% of the Nordic interest groups that 
have had direct meetings with MEPs are individual organisations, whereas 35% are national 
associations. Only 45% that have had meetings have a Brussels office. However, it appears 
that the larger staff size the interest groups have, the more likely they are to have direct 
Figure 4.9: Number of interest groups that have had meetings with MEPs. Total frequency to the left and per 
country to the right. Sources: Adriana Bunea and Raimondas Ibenskas’ original dataset on meetings between IGs 
and MEPs based on the EP official website. 
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meetings with MEPs. Furthermore, the large majority of the interest groups that have had 
meetings spend more than 500,000 euros on lobbying activities. Hence, it seems as though H1 
and H3 are true when it comes to direct meetings with MEPs: having resources is important 
for directly meeting MEPs, and particularly business groups gain access to the legislators. 
 
The fact that relatively few Norwegian interest groups have had meetings with MEPs might 
not be surprising, since Norway is not a member of the EU and consequently has no elected 
representatives in the EP. At least one would assume that interest groups would meet with 
MEPs from their own country. Table 4.4 presents a more nuanced pattern.7 Finnish interest 
groups, in particular, meet MEPs from Finland. As many as 41 out of 47 meetings with MEPs 
were only with national MEPs, 5 with national and/or Nordic and others, while only 1 
meeting was with others. This also applies to Swedish interest groups, but in addition they 
have had several meetings with MEPs of other nationalities. Danish interest groups do not 
meet as often with only national MEPs, neither do they meet equally frequently with MEPs, 
compared to the Finnish and Swedish interest groups. The table shows that Norwegian 
interest groups meet as often with Nordic MEPs as with others. However, like the Danish, 
Norwegian interest groups do not frequently meet with MEPs. See Appendix C to see the 
names and nationalities of the MEPs that the Nordic IGs have had meetings with. 
 
Table 4.4: The Nordic interest groups’ direct meetings with MEPs, based on the nationality of 
the MEPs involved in the meetings. 
Nationality of MEPs Norwegian IGs Danish IGs Swedish IGs Finnish IGs 
Same nationality NA 9 25 41 
Same nationality/Nordic NA NA 3 2 
Same nationality/Other NA NA 2 3 
Nordic 4 1 4 NA 
Nordic/Other 1 2 1 NA 
Other 4 8 6 1 
All NA 1 NA NA 
Total number of meetings 9 21 41 47 
Sources: Adriana Bunea and Raimondas Ibenskas’ original dataset on meetings between IGs and MEPs 





7 To be clear, meetings with MEPs may include one or several MEPs at once – hence the subdivision of 
nationalities in Table 4.4. 
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Outside lobbying strategies – media access 
 
A total of 194 of the 803 Nordic interest groups (24%) have been mentioned in Euractiv, 
Euronews and/or Politico.eu. 55 interest groups are mentioned more than five times and only 
a few interest groups are mentioned more than 20 times. See Appendix D for an overview of 
the ten interest groups per Nordic country that appear in the media most frequently. For 
example, the Norwegian interest group Equinor8 was mentioned 18 times, while the Danish 
interest group A.P. Møller – Mærsk A/S was mentioned 54 times, the Swedish Ericsson was 
mentioned 62 times and the Finnish Nokia was mentioned 92 times. Nokia has the maximum 
number of media appearance among the Nordic interest groups. The percentage of interest 
groups mentioned is quite similar among Danish, Swedish and Finnish interest groups: around 
20-24% of these interest groups are mentioned in the media.  
 
As many as 37% of the Norwegian interest groups appear in the three media outlets, a fairly 
high percentage compared to the other Nordic interest groups. Appendix D shows that the 
Nordic interest groups that appear in the media most frequently are institutions or resource-
rich business groups. As Table 4.5 on the following page shows, the maximum number of 
mentions are not as high as for interest groups from the other Nordic countries. Nonetheless, 
Table 4.5 also indicates that, on average, Norwegian interest groups are mentioned as 
frequently as Swedish interest groups. 
 
Interest groups with the highest number of media appearances have in common that they are 
all individual business groups and also quite resource-rich groups. They have larger staff sizes 
compared to those IGs not mentioned. However, it is worth mentioning that the staff sizes are 
not considerably large, but it seems to be the case that those IGs who are most often 
mentioned also have the greatest staff sizes. The majority of the interest groups with media 
access do not spend much on lobbying activities, which is consistent with the argument 
stating that resource-poor groups rely on outside lobbying strategies and thus supportive of 
H1. Nonetheless, 70% of interest groups that have been mentioned in media have a Brussels 
office. Moreover, it is apparent that the higher lobbying expenses, the more mentions in 
media. For instance, the interest groups mentioned above are also among the Nordic interest 
 
8 The number is actually higher, as Equinor changed its name from Statoil in 2018. Because I do not have this 
knowledge of other Nordic interest groups, it would have been biased to include mentions of Statoil. 
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groups that spend the most on lobbying activities. This supports the notion that resource-rich 
interest groups are more likely to implement both inside and outside lobbying strategies to 
gain larger influence on EU policymaking, due to their abilities of investing in both (Weiler 
and Brändli 2015, 8). 
 
Table 4.5: Univariate summary statistics for Media access. 








Min 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 92 18 54 62 92 
Average 1,6 1,7 2,0 1,7 1,1 
Median 0 0 0 0 0 
St. dev. 6,4 3,8 6,7 6,9 6,1 
N 803 86 186 267 264 
 
 
4.1.3 What explains the choice of lobbying strategies? 
 
A total of 32% of the Nordic interest groups have had one or several meetings with the EC 
high level officials. This is consistent with the hypothesis proposing that business groups are 
more likely to choose inside strategies, considering that 47% of the Nordic interest groups 
represent business. Furthermore, the descriptive analysis shows that 82% of the Nordic 
interest groups have a Brussels office: a resource that according to the literature should make 
it easier to get close to EU policymaking. However, the analysis also shows that most of the 
Nordic interest groups are small and financially resource-poor, which may be the reason why 
the percentage of interest groups meeting the Commission is not higher. 19% of the Nordic 
interest groups are members of EC expert groups, 14% have EP passes and 15% have had 
meetings with MEPs. Regarding meetings with MEPs, there are some differences between the 
Nordic countries. The Swedish and Finnish interest groups have had more meetings compared 
to the Danish and Norwegian interest groups, and also more frequently meet with MEPs 
compared to the Danish ones. 24% of the Nordic interest groups are mentioned in Euractiv, 
Euronews and/or Politico.eu. It is apparent that Nordic interest groups rely on both inside and 
outside lobbying strategies, and it remains to see what explains the types of lobbying 
strategies used to influence EU institutions and decision-makers.  
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4.2 Explanatory analysis: inside and outside lobbying strategies 
 
The first hypothesis of this thesis posits that resource-rich groups are more likely to choose 
inside lobbying strategies, relative to outside strategies and lobbying in coalitions than 
resource-poor interest groups. Building on this, the second hypothesis proposes that resource-
poor groups are more likely to lobby through coalitions relative to inside and outside 
strategies than resource-rich interest groups. The third hypothesis sets forth that business 
organisations are more likely to choose inside lobbying strategies relative to outside strategies 
and coalitions than other types of groups. In the following analysis, the first and the third 
hypothesis are answered, while the second hypothesis is addressed when analysing the online 
survey data. 
 
Inside lobbying and outside lobbying is thus examined empirically, and my unit of 
observation and analysis is an interest group. In total I have five regression models for five 
variables that enables me to measure the three dependent variables: access to the EC, access 
to the EP and access to media. Recall that since the dependent variables are measured 
differently, separate methods are necessary to analyse the data. The three count variables 
require negative binomial regression and the two dummy variables demand logistic 
regression.  
 
4.2.1 Negative binomial regression: explaining inside and outside lobbying 
strategies 
 
Table 4.6 presents the results of the negative binomial regressions for the three count 
variables: IG meetings with EC high level officials, Number of passes to access the EP 
premises and Media access. The raw coefficients in a negative binomial regression represent 
the change in the logarithm of the dependent variables (count variables) for a one-unit change 
in the independent variable (NCSS Statistical Software 2020). Trying to explain coefficients 
in logged form is not particularly straightforward, and alternatives would be to compute 
marginal effects or exponentiating these coefficients (incidence rate ratio). I present the 
results in incidence rate ratio (IRR) instead, which are exponentiated coefficients and can be 
interpreted as the marginal factor change in the dependent variable for one-unit change in the 
independent variable (Hilbe 2011, 20; Hilbe 2014, 64). In general, the IRR can be interpreted 
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as follows: if it is 1 or close to 1, it suggests no or little difference; an IRR larger than 1 means 
an increased probability; while an IRR below 1 suggests a reduced likelihood. For dummies 
and categorical variables with more than two categories, the IRR is the ratio of the expressed 
category to the reference category (Hilbe 2011, 19). 
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Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *0.01. 
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IG meetings with EC high level officials 
 
Model 1 presents the results of the negative binomial regression for the dependent variable IG 
meetings with EC high level officials. As expected, the reported results for the variable 
Interest type represented show that business groups are more likely to meet with EC high 
level officials. The IRR for Consultancies is 0.47 times the incidence rate for the reference 
group (Business groups), significant at a 0.1-level. Likewise, the IRR for NGOs is 0.14 times 
the IRR for the reference group holding the other variables constant - significant at a 0.01-
level.  The IRR for Trade unions/professional organisations is 0,86 times the IRR for Business 
groups, but it is not statistically significant. Institutions and Public authorities are both 
significant (p<0.01), and the respective IRRs are 0.50 and 0.32 times the incidence rate for 
business groups. Other is significant (p<0.1) and the IRR is 0.34 times the incidence rate for 
business groups. The part of the third hypothesis that argues that business groups are more 
likely to choose inside lobbying strategies, compared to other group types, is therefore 
supported.  
 
The IRR for the variable Staff size shows a 2.8% greater likelihood for meeting with EC high 
level officials, but the effect is not statistically significant. It looks like having a Brussels 
office matters, however. The variable Brussels office shows that interest groups with a 
Brussels office are 3.36 times more likely to have meetings with EC high level officials, 
compared to interest groups that do not have a Brussels office (p<0.01). It thus looks like 
resource-rich interest groups are more likely to choose inside lobbying strategies, compared to 
resource-poor groups. 
 
Control variables are also included, and the variable Organisational form shows that 
individual organisations are more likely to meet with EC high level officials, compared to the 
other organisational forms. The IRR for National associations and European associations are, 
respectively, 0.30 and 0.16 times more than the IRR for Individual organisations – both 
significant at a 0.001-level. The IRR for Other is 0.425 times the IRR for Individual 
organisations, but it is not statistically significant. The estimate for the control variable, MS is 
EU member, is significant at a 0.001-level and the incidence rate ratio shows that interest 
groups based in EU member countries are 2.86 times more likely to have meetings with EC 
high level officials, compared to interest groups based in Norway. For the Registration Year-
variable the incidence rate ratio of the dependent variable decreases by a factor of 0.72 – 
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significant at a 0.001-level as well. This indicates that the more recently an IG has registered 




Number of passes to access the EP premises 
 
Model 2 presents the results of the negative binomial regression for the dependent variable 
Number of passes to access the EP premises. The case is a bit different when it comes to 
number of passes to access the EP premises. The results show that business groups are not 
necessarily more likely to have passes, as the IRR for consultancies is 1.43. This is not 
statistically significant, however, and in fact only the features of being an NGO or a public 
authority has a significant effect. They are less likely to have EP passes, compared to 
Business groups: NGOs have an IRR of 0.18 more than IRR for Business groups (p<0.01), 
while Public authorities have an IRR of 0.21 more than IRR for Business groups (p<0.001). 
Consequently, H3 cannot be supported when it comes to EP passes. 
 
Staff size and having a Brussels office matter. The IRR for Staff size shows a 9% greater 
likelihood for an IG having passes to access the EP premises for unit increase in staff size. 
Interest groups with a Brussels office are 6.41 times more likely to have EP passes, as 
opposed to interest groups without. Both the effect of Staff size and Brussels office are 
significant at a 0.001-level. As a result, H1 is supported: resources seem to matter for the 
number of passes to access the EP premises. 
 
The variable Organisational form shows that Other are the most likely to have EP passes, 
followed by European associations in second, national associations in third and individual 
organisations the last. However, the variable does not have a significant effect on the 
dependent variable. The variable MS is EU member shows 85% greater likelihood for interest 
groups from the Nordic countries that are members of the EU to have more passes to access 
the EP premises, compared to interest groups from Norway (p< 0.01). For Registration Year 
the incidence rate ratio of the dependent variable decreases by a factor of 0.82 and is 
significant at a 0.001-level. This means that, like for EC meetings, the earlier an interest group 






Model 3 presents the results of the negative binomial regression for the dependent variable 
Media access. The variable Interest type represented shows that institutions are more likely 
than business groups to have appear in the media. They have an IRR of 1.794, however the 
effect is not statistically significant. The rest of the interest type represented are less likely to 
be mentioned in the media, compared to business groups. The IRR for both consultancies and 
NGOs is 0.18 times the incidence rate for business groups, significant at a 0.001-level. The 
IRR for trade unions/professional organisations is 0.4 times the IRR for business groups and 
significant at a 0.1-level. Public authorities is significant (p<0.001) and the IRR is 0.27 times 
the incidence rate for business groups. Other is 0.41 times the IRR for business groups, but it 
is not statistically significant. Consequently, there is only partial support for H3, because 
business groups are not less likely to choose outside lobbying strategies than other interest 
types.  
 
The variables Staff size and Brussels office matter for media access – both significant at a 
0.001-level. The IRR for Staff size shows a 14% greater likelihood for an IG to appear in the 
media. Interest groups with a Brussels office are 2.51 times more likely to have media access, 
compared to interest groups without. It is apparent that the bigger and more resourceful the 
group, the greater the chance of being mentioned in the media. As discovered in the 
descriptive analysis: the interest groups most frequently appearing in the media are all large 
and resource-rich interest groups. Accordingly, organisational resources are important for 
outside lobbying strategies as well.  
 
The organisational form of an interest group also seems to matter as individual organisations 
are more likely to appear in media, compared to other organisational forms. The IRR for 
National associations is 0.13 times more than the incidence rate for Individual organisations 
and significant at a 0.01-level. The IRR for European associations is 0.06 times more than the 
IRR for Individual organisations – significant at a 0.5-level. The IRR for Other is 1.0 times 
the IRR for Individual organisations, but it is not statistically significant. The variable MS is 
EU Member shows a 4.2% greater likelihood for interest groups based in the Nordic countries 
that are EU members to appear in media, compared to interest groups from Norway. 
However, the effect is not statistically significant and nonetheless a weak effect. For 
Registration Year the incidence rate ratio of the dependent variable decreases by a factor of 
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0.87 and is significant (p<0.001). It thus seems that how established an interest group is in 
Brussels matters regardless of strategy. Hence, interest groups with several years of 
experience in lobbying the EU, are more likely to be mentioned in the media. This also seems 
to be the case of IG direct meetings MEPs and IG membership in EC expert groups. 
 
4.2.2 Logistic regression: explaining inside lobbying strategies  
 
Table 4.7: Logistic regression: inside lobbying strategies. 
 
 
 Model 4  Model 5 
  DV: IG direct meetings with 
MEPs 
 DV: IG membership in EC 
expert groups 
 





Ref.  Ref. 












































































N  803  803 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.  ***p<0.001 **p<0.05 *0.01. 
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Table 4.7 shows the results of the logistic regression models for the dependent variables IG 
direct meetings with MEPs and IG membership in EC expert groups. The logistic regression 
coefficients give the change in the log odds of the outcome for a one unit increase in the 
predictor variables (source). However, because the log odds do not tell us much else other 
than the direction of the effects, I present predicted probabilities for the variables with 
significant effects. The probabilities can give a more intuitive measure of the overall effect.  
 
IG direct meetings with MEPs 
 
Model 4 presents the results for the dependent variable IG direct meetings with MEPs. It 
shows that Nordic business groups are more likely to have meetings with MEPs, compared to 
other interest types represented. All indicators of the variable Interest type represented are 
non-significant, however, with the exception of public authorities (p<0.01). Figure 4.10 shows 
the predicted probabilities for the variable Interest type represented. Nordic institutions are 
most likely to have direct meetings with MEPs, the predicted probability being 15.3%, but the 
effect is not statistically significant. Nordic public authorities are the least likely to have direct 
meetings with MEPs, with a predicted probability of 6.5%. The predicted probability that 
Nordic business groups have direct meetings with MEPs is 14.8%, i.e. higher than the others, 
but below Nordic institutions.  
 
Figure 4.10: Predicted probabilities of direct meeting with MEPs for different interest type 
represented. Only Public authorities is significantly different from Business. 
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No matter which group type business groups were compared with, the predicted probabilities 
are not very high. Furthermore, there is not a large difference between the groups in terms of 
the predicted probability. That does not signify that all Nordic interest groups irrespective of 
interest type have equal access to legislators: business groups are more likely compared to all 
types with the exception of institutions. However, as mentioned, the effect of institutions is 
not statistically significant. Consequently, the third hypothesis on business groups being more 
likely to choose inside lobbying strategies relative to other types of groups, is not supported 
when it comes to direct meetings with MEPs. 
 
The effects of Staff size and Brussels office are both significant at a 0,001-level and have 
positive effects on the dependent variable. Staff size appears to have a statistically significant 
effect. Figure 4.11 displays the predicted probabilities for staff size and shows that the higher 
staff size, the higher the probability of having direct meetings with MEPs. For example, a 
staff size of 10 FTE gives a predicted probability of 20%, while a staff size of 30 FTE 





Figure 4.11: Predicted probabilities of direct meeting with MEPs for Staff size. 
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Furthermore, IGs with a Brussels office have a 31% predicted probability of having direct 
meetings with MEPs. IGs that do not have a Brussels office have a 10% predicted probability 
of having direct meetings with MEPs. Although the predicted probabilities of having a 
Brussels office are not particularly high, there is a stark difference between having an office 
or not. Accordingly, it means that having a Brussels office matters for whether interest groups 
meet with MEPs or not. This is in line with the literature that argues that being situated in 
Brussels improves the chances of getting close to EU policymaking (Mahoney 2004, 453; 
Bunea 2014, 1229; Bouwen 2002, 374). These results support part of the first hypothesis: 
resource-rich groups are more likely to choose inside lobbying strategies, in this case direct 
meetings with MEPs, relative to resource-poor interest groups. 
 
The variable MS is EU member also seems to have a positive and significant effect (p<0.01) 
on the dependent variable, which means that interest groups based in EU member countries 
are more likely to have direct meetings with MEPs. Being an interest group based in an EU 
member state has a predicted probability of 13%, while an interest group based in Norway has 
a predicted probability of 7%. Accordingly, there is a difference, but the very effect of EU 
membership is not particularly strong on the dependent variable. This indicates that although 
Danish, Swedish and Finnish interest groups are more likely to have direct meetings with 
MEPs, the likelihood is not exceptionally larger than for Norwegian interest groups. This is a 
very interesting finding, considering Norway is not a member of the EU. Not only does it tell 
us that Norwegian interest groups have access to MEPs despite their lack of representation in 
the EP, but also that the difference between being member of the EU and a non-EU member is 
not tremendously substantial when it comes to meetings with MEPs. This supports the 
argument ascertaining that Norway has a special relationship with the EU (Leruth 2014; 
Eliassen and Peneva 2011).  
 
Registration year is significant too (p<0.05) but has a negative effect on the dependent 
variable. Put differently, the more recently an IG is registered in the Transparency Register, 
the less likelihood of meeting directly with MEPs. Nonetheless, the predicted probabilities in 
Figure 4.12 do not show particularly large decreases. For example, interest groups registered 
in 2012 have a predicted probability about 13.5%, while interest groups registered in 2017 









IG membership in EC expert groups 
 
The results in Model 5 in Table 4.7 explain IG membership in EC expert groups and show 
that Nordic business groups are not more likely to be members of EC expert groups, 
compared to other Nordic interest groups. However, only the coefficients for Trade 
unions/professional organisations and Institutions have significant effects (p<0.001). As 
Figure 4.13 shows, business groups have a 15% predicted probability of membership in EC 
expert groups. The predicted probability of trade unions/professional organisations is 22%, 
whereas it is 36% for institutions, which is well over average compared to other interest 
groups. Figure 4.13 shows that business groups are not more likely to have membership in EC 
expert groups, compared to other types of groups. Moreover, the results in Table 4.7 
unexpectedly show that the variable Brussels office in fact has a negative effect on the IG 
membership in EC expert groups. However, it is not statistically significant, and neither is the 
effect of Staff size.  
Figure 4.12: Predicted probabilities of direct meeting with MEPs for Registration year 
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Accordingly, neither H1 nor H3 can be supported when it comes to membership in EC expert 
groups. Although membership in EC expert groups is an inside lobbying strategy, it stands out 
a bit from the others. As emphasised by Dür and Mateo (2016, 171), membership in EU 
expert groups is highly influenced by the European Commission’s decision to invite some 
groups rather than others. Moreover, because the Commission desires to appear balanced (e.g. 
the 2001 White Paper on European Governance), it makes it less likely to find business bias in 
the membership of these expert groups (Dür and Mateo 2016, 171). Because Nordic interest 
groups are also the most resource-rich interest groups, it might explain why resources do not 






Organisational form plays a role and explains comment. The effect of the Organisational form 
variable indicates that individual organisations are more likely to have membership in EC 
expert groups, compared to national associations. Nevertheless, European associations are the 
most likely to have membership in EC expert groups. Both effects are significant at a 0.01-
level. Figure 4.14 shows that individual organisations have a probability of 18% and national 
associations a predicted probability of 14%. Nonetheless, European associations are more 
Figure 4.13: Predicted probabilities of membership in EC expert groups for interest type represented. 
Only Trade unions/prof.org and Institutions are significantly different from Business. 
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likely to have membership in EC expert groups, compared to individual organisations and 
national associations. Figure 4.14 displays that European associations have a predicted 
probability of having membership in EC expert groups is 43%, which is more than twice the 






Moreover, the EU member-variable shows that being an IG based in an EU member country 
does not necessarily increase the likelihood of membership in EC expert groups. The effect is 
not statistically significant, but it makes sense given that several Norwegian interest groups 
are members of EC expert. One could argue that EEA membership matters and maybe 
reduces the effect of EU membership when it comes to technocratic evidence-based 
policymaking, like one taking place in these expert committees. Registration year is 
significant (p<0.001) and has a negative effect: being recently registered in the Transparency 
Register, decreases the likelihood of membership in EC expert groups for interest groups. 
This indicates that Nordic interest groups need to build reputation and trust and consolidate 
their relationship with the Commission services before being picked to join them. Figure 4.15 
presents the predicted probabilities of registration year and clearly shows that older interest 
Figure 4.14: Predicted probabilities of IG membership in EC expert groups for organisational form. 
Only National and European associations are significantly different from Individual organisations. 
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groups are more likely to have memberships in EC expert groups. For example, interest 
groups registered in 2008 have about a 40% predicted probability, while interest groups in 















Figure 4.15: Predicted probabilities of IG membership in EC expert groups for Registration year 
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4.2.3 Is the choice of lobbying strategies determined by trust and 
reputation? 
 
The analyses suggest some trends for inside lobbying strategies, but also some differences. 
Resources seem to matter for all inside lobbying strategies with the exception of Nordic IG 
membership in EC expert groups. Dür and Mateo (2016) also find that the case of 
membership in EC expert groups is different from other inside lobbying strategies. As stated, 
the Commission desires to appear balanced, which might explain why resources matter for the 
inside lobbying strategies of IG meetings with EC high level officials, IG direct meetings with 
MEPs and Number of passes to access the EP premises, but not for IG membership in EC 
expert groups.  
 
Furthermore, compared to other interest types represented, Nordic business groups are more 
likely to have meetings with EC high level officials or MEPs. This is also the case of having 
EP passes, with the exception of consultancies. They are not more likely, however, to have 
membership of EC expert groups. Regarding organisational form, there are diverse findings. 
Nordic individual organisations are the most likely to have meetings with EC high level 
officials. This is not the case for IG membership in EC expert groups, where European 
associations are more likely to have membership. IGs based in an EU member state are more 
likely to pursue inside lobbying strategies, with the exception of membership in EC expert 
groups. An effect that has been consistent, however, is Registration Year. How long an 
interest group has been registered in the Transparency Register seems to matter for inside 
lobbying strategies. This indicates that the more established interest groups are in lobbying 
the EU, the more likely they will gain access to bureaucrats and legislators. This appears to be 
the case for outside lobbying strategies as well. Additionally, the more resources interest 
groups have, the more likely they will have media access. This is in line with the literature 
which argues that more resources make it possible to choose both outside and inside lobbying 







4.3 Online survey analysis 
  
To complement the analysis of data about Nordic interest groups provided by the EU 
Transparency Register, I conducted an online survey. An additional online survey may 
provide complementary insights together with the Transparency Register. A total of 143 
Nordic interest groups participated in the online survey: 17 Norwegian (12%), 29 Danish 
(20%), 58 Swedish (41%) and 39 Finnish interest groups (27%). It is always desirable to have 
a sample that is as representative as possible. The percentage proportions are not 
tremendously different compared to the sample in the original dataset with 803 Nordic interest 




Figure 4.16 shows the type of interests represented by the interest groups that participated in 
the online survey. To be consistent, I have divided them into similar categories as the original 
dataset.9 The figure shows that the three largest represented interest types are public interest 
organisations/NGOs (31%), trade union/professional organisations (24%) and business (20%). 
Institutions and consultancies, respectively, amount to 5% and 3%, public authorities 
constitute 9% and other 8%. The percentage proportions are not similar to the original dataset: 
in the original dataset business constitute 40% while only 20% in the online survey. Trade 
unions, which is only 8% in the dataset, make up 24% of the online survey respondents. 
 
9 Institution was not a choice option in the questionnaire, but several interest groups wrote that they are 
institutions when ticking off “other”. There were also several who chose “other” but wrote that they are an 

















Figure 4.16: Interest types represented by Nordic interest groups that participated in the online survey. 
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Furthermore, NGOs constitute 31%, while only 23% in the online survey. Moreover, 
according to the survey answers, only 30% of the Nordic interest groups that participated in 
the online survey have a Brussels office. This is in line with the coded information on 
Brussels offices in my original dataset. Nonetheless, the fact that there are such differences 
between the interest groups in the original dataset and the interest groups that responded the 
online survey, imposes a problem of comparison. Consequently, the differences need to be 






Figure 4.17 shows that there is a difference in how frequent the interest groups that 
participated in the online survey employ the different lobbying strategies. A vast majority of 
the Nordic interest groups that participated in the online survey had direct contact with 
policymakers and/or public officials. 24 of the 143 interest groups (16%) have direct contact 
on a weekly basis; 24% about 6-15 times a year; 20% about 2-5 times a year and 9% of the 
Nordic interest groups have direct contact with policymakers only once a year or less. In other 
words, there is variation in how often Nordic interest groups have direct contacts with EU 
policymakers and/or public officials. However, Figure 4.17 shows that direct contact (i.e. 
inside lobbying strategy) is the most frequently applied strategy among Nordic interest 
groups. 
 
Using social media campaigns (Twitter, Facebook, etc.), considered an outside lobbying 
strategy, is the second most common used strategy. 33% of the interest groups use social 
media campaigns 6-9 times a year or more, and 15% of them on a weekly basis. Nonetheless, 
most of them only use social media campaigns once a year or less. Participating in the 
Figure 4.17: Frequencies of lobbying strategies applied by Nordic interest groups to participate in 
and influence EU decision-making and legislation. 
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European Commission’s open consultations is the third most common used strategy, which is 
an inside lobbying strategy. However, the majority of the Nordic interest groups participate in 
consultations about 2-5 times a year or less, while 21% of them participate in consultations 
about 6 times a year or more. Lastly, distributing a press release (i.e. outside lobbying 
strategy) to influence EU decision-making is the least common strategy out of the four. 18% 
distribute a press release about 6 times a year or more. Most of them distribute a press release 
once a year or less, and 27% about 2-5 times a year. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting finding in the online survey is that most of the Nordic interest 
groups lobby in coalitions as their main approach to lobby EU institutions and policymaking. 
Roughly 75% of them answered that lobbying in coalitions is their main strategy - either as 
part of a European federation, as part of ad hoc coalitions or other types of collaborations. 
Figure 4.18 shows that only 13% work alone and 1% with the help of a public consultancy 
firm. 25% answered “other”, but many answered that they combine lobbying as part of 
European federations, ad hoc coalitions or other types. After viewing the text answers for 
“others” there were 20 interest groups that said lobbying in coalitions is their main strategy. A 
disadvantage of the survey is not only that respondents may be unable to single out one main 
strategy, but also that the survey asks them to do so and consequently restrains them from 
providing an adequate answer. Many interest groups answered that they equally apply the first 
three alternatives: work alone, lobby as part of European federation and as part of ad hoc 
coalitions. Nevertheless, the important discovery is that the majority of the Nordic interest 





Figure 4.18: Nordic interest groups’ main approaches to lobby EU institutions and policymaking. 
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Given that most of the Nordic IGs that participated in the online survey are NGOs and trade 
unions, it is not surprising that most of them prefer lobbying in coalitions. However, among 
the 18 IGs that answered that their main approach is to work alone, there is only 3 business 
groups. The rest constitutes of 3 public authorities, 7 NGOs, 1 trade union, 2 institutions and 2 
consultancies. This means that also business groups prefer to join coalitions to lobby EU 
institutions and policymaking. Nonetheless, 50% of the business groups that participated in 
the survey are resource-poor (i.e. spends less than 100,000 euros in lobbying activities). As a 
matter of fact, the majority of the Nordic interest groups that participated in the online survey 
are resource-poor (the mean is 1,7 and the median is 1 for Financial resources). Additionally, 
several IGs, representing different interest types, wrote that they do not have enough 
resources to lobby actively on their own. The 18 IGs that prefer to work alone, however, are a 
bit more resourceful (both the mean and median are 2 for Financial resources). These findings 
emphasise the underlying argument in H2, as it seems as resource-poor groups are more likely 
to lobby through coalitions to influence EU policymaking.  
 
Figure 4.19 presents the interest groups’ answers on the question asking them to indicate 
which of the EU institutions mentioned is the main target of their organisation’s attempt to 
communicate with EU decision-makers. 56% of the Nordic interest groups answered that the 
European Commission is their main target, while 21% said the European Parliament. 
Respectively, only 4% regard the European Council or regulatory agencies as their main 
target. None of the interest groups view The Committee of Regions as their main target, and 
only 1% answered that their main target institution is the European Economic and Social 
committee. 14% of the Nordic interest answered “other” – and here too, the question and 
choice options restrict the Nordic interest groups from providing an adequate answer.  
 
Figure 4.19: Main target EU institutions of Nordic interest groups attempting to communicate with 
EU decision-makers. 
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Several of the interest groups answered that the Commission, the European Parliament and 
the Council are equally important – depending on the issue at hand and the status of the 
discussions and/or proposals. Some commented that the Commission and Parliament are 
considered equally important and their main targets. What is noteworthy is that these 
constitute IGs from all four Nordic countries, and most of them represent business and 
individual organisations. Moreover, an interest group answered that they prefer targeting the 
Commission, and that targeting the Council is not preferable because it goes through national 
channels which make the processes slow. This interest group is an institution which is quite 
resource-rich, and hence able to invest in strategies that focuses on gaining access to EC high 
level officials. However, Table 4.8 shows that nearly 68% of the Nordic interest groups 
consider targeting/talking to national governments and/or responsible ministries at national 
level one of their main targets.  
 
Nonetheless, most of the Nordic interest groups answered that lobbying in Brussels is 
preferable to shape EU legislation and decision-making, in line with the argument that IGs 
lobby where regulation is being decided. About 63% of the Nordic interest groups are most 
likely to target the EU institutions, whereas roughly 29% target/talk to the national permanent 
representation. Several interest groups that answered “other” reported that it depends on the 
issue. Others wrote that they target local/regional policymakers, think tanks, UN agencies and 
umbrella organisations. The answers thus reveal that lobbying at both national level and in 
Brussels is important for the Nordic interest groups to shape EU legislation and decision-




Table 4.8: Main targets of where Nordic interest groups attempt to shape EU legislation 
and decision-making. 
 Respondents Percent 
At national level, targeting/talking to national governments and/or 
responsible ministries 
97 67.8% 
In Brussels, targeting/talking to the national permanent representation 41 28.7% 
In Brussels, targeting the EU institutions 90 62.9% 
Other (if yes, please indicate where) 19 13.3% 
Total 143 100.0% 
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The interest groups were asked to rank the Commission, the European Parliament and the 
Council on the importance to their attempts to shape EU legislation. Figures 4.20, 4.21 and 
4.22 show that the Commission and European Parliament are both considered moderately 
important or highly important, while the Council is also regarded as not important at all to 
some of the Nordic interest groups. The Commission is regarded as highly important to the 
vast majority: 92% answered that it is highly important, whereas only 8% of the interest 
groups consider the Commission to be of moderate importance. According to Figure 4.20, this 
is in relation to the interest groups’ views on how difficult they find it to approach the 
Commission. Among the 12 interest groups that consider the Commission as very difficult to 
approach, 33% said the Commission is moderately important for their attempts to shape EU 
legislation. What characterises these interest groups is that they are small, resource-poor 
interest groups (all below an FTE of 2,25 and none have a Brussels office). Furthermore, they 
constitute of diffuse interests: most of them represent NGOs, while the rest are trade unions 






71 out of 143 Nordic interest groups (50%) argue that the Commission is somewhat difficult 
to approach, while 42% view it as easy to approach. This makes sense considering that most 
of the IGs that participated in this survey are NGOs, which usually represent diffuse interest. 
The finding is thus in line with the literature that generally argues that diffuse interests are 
less likely to lobby the Commission, as it is in need of specific expertise (e.g. Dür and Mateo 
2016, 2-3; Mahoney 2008, 152; Bunea 2014, 1229). The answers regarding the European 
Parliament are a little more diversified, as shown in Figure 4.21. 62% regard the EP as highly 
important, while 38% consider it moderately important. The majority also considers the EP to 
be easy to approach, and in fact easier to reach than the Commission. 
Figure 4.20: Rank of importance and approach difficulty of the Commission for 










As presented in Figure 4.22, the majority (51%) consider the Council moderately important, 
while 38% believe it is highly important. Most interest groups also think it is somewhat 
difficult to approach the Council, as only 14 interest groups find it easy. 11% of the Nordic 
interest groups perceive the Council not important at all for them to influence EU legislation. 
19% of those who regard the Council as difficult to reach also believe it is not important for 
their influence. It is clear that all the institutions are important to the interest groups, but that 
the Commission is the most important. Parliament comes in second place of importance but is 
considered the easiest to approach. The Council is for the most part considered moderately 
important, while 38% experience it very difficult to obtain contact. These findings are in line 
with the existing research and its previous findings (Coen and Richardson 2009). 
 
The interest groups were asked which organisational recourses inform and determine their 
choice of lobbying strategies targeting EU institutions and decision-making. Figure 4.23 
shows that 42% answered that staff resources are most important, and 34% that processing the 
right information and policy expertise is the most important. 15% argue that financial 
Figure 4.21: Rank of importance and approach difficulty of the European 
Parliament for Nordic interest groups to shape EU legislation 
 
Figure 4.22: Rank of importance and approach difficulty of the Council 
for Nordic interest groups to shape EU legislation 
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resources determine their choice, whereas 10% answered “other organisational resources”. 
Other resources include a combination of financial, staff and informational resources, 











The Nordic interest groups were also asked which lobbying strategy, in their view, is most 
likely to lead to lobbying success and policy influence when attempting to shape EU decision-
making. Table 4.9 illustrates that 85.3% argue that direct contacts with policymakers and/or 
public officials (i.e. inside lobbying strategies) lead to lobbying success. 4.2% argue that 
participating in the European Commission’s open consultations. Only 1 interest group argues 
that using social media campaigns (i.e. outside lobbying strategies) leads to success. 9,8% 
chose the “Other”-option. Some wrote that working through European federations and other 
coalition forms lead to success, whereas others argue that a combination of the strategies is 
necessary or that it depends on the goal. These answers are in line with the literature on 
lobbying success, which mainly argues that direct lobbying of the Commission, i.e. inside 
lobbying strategies, is the most influential way (Coen and Richardson 2009; Marshall 2010; 
Dür et al. 2015). 
 
Table 4.9: Lobbying strategies that most likely lead to lobbying success, according to the 
Nordic interest groups that participated in the survey 
 Respondents Percent 
Direct contacts with policymakers and/or public officials 122 85.3% 
Participating in the European Commission's open consultations 6 4.2% 
Distributing a press release 0 0.0% 
Using social media campaigns (Twitter, Facebook, etc.) 1 0.7% 
Other (please indicate which) 14 9.8% 
Total 143 100.0% 
Figure 4.23: Organisational resources that inform and determine Nordic  
interest groups’ choice of lobbying strategies in Brussels 
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4.3.1 Additional insights about the Nordic interest groups  
 
The main response from the Nordic interest groups participating in the online survey was that 
European lobbying is hard for small and resource-poor interest groups, which supports the 
hypotheses on resources. Some argued that it is difficult to gain access to policymakers and 
legislators in policy areas with “big players”, and that is the reason for why they lobby 
through coalitions. This is in line with the literature on policy context, arguing that policy 
context is decisive for the choice of lobbying strategies (Dür and Mateo 2016; Coen and 
Katsaitis 2013). Several interest groups stressed that lobbying strategies (and lobbying 
success) only really depend on the policy issue. What is fascinating is that these interest 
groups mostly represent business, as well as being among the most resourceful IGs that 
participated in the survey.  
 
In contrast, a handful of interest groups responded that they experience lobbying the EU as an 
easy undertaking. These were mostly business groups, but also included other types of interest 
groups such as NGOs and. For instance, one Finnish interest group representing business, 
wrote that approaching the EU institutions (especially the Commission, Parliament and 
Regulatory Agencies) is a straightforward process. The argument was that they are usually 
open to listen and to consult stakeholders with their perspectives. This is in accordance with 
the literature arguing that EU institutions (in particular the Commission) is in need of specific 
expertise (e.g. Dür and Mateo 2016, 2-3; Mahoney 2008, 152; Bunea 2014, 1229).  
 
Furthermore, some interest groups highlighted that the EU institution of target depends on the 
stage in the EU decision making. In the early stages, the Commission is the most likely 
institution to try to influence, while that will change when the process reaches the Parliament. 
Additionally, several interest groups reported that finding the right person (responsible of the 
matter at hand) is crucial. Numerous interest groups wrote that personal relations and 
networking make a difference when it comes to gaining access, emphasising that there is a 
“strength of weak ties” (Granovetter 1973). They argue that finding partners in other countries 
who have the same challenges is key when lobbying the European Union. Likewise, one 
Swedish NGO wrote that lobbying a mix of institutions is the key to success, however “built 
on professional conversations based on knowledge and experience”.   
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4.3.2 Explanatory analysis: lobbying in coalitions 
 
The online survey reveals a very interesting finding: that Nordic IGs participate in coalitions 
to lobby EU institutions and decision-making. I want to take a closer look at what might 
explain this. Model 6 in Table 4.10 on the following page presents the results of the logistic 
regression with lobbying in coalitions as the dependent variable. As none of the results are 
statistically significant, I simply comment the trends.10 The variable Interest type represented 
shows that only NGOs and institutions are more likely to lobby as coalitions, compared to 
business groups, which is in line with existing literature (e.g. Mahoney 2008; Dür and Mateo 
2016). That all other groups are less likely to join coalitions, compared to business groups, 
makes sense considering that the other groups include consultancies, trade unions and public 
authorities. Consultancies work for others and provide them expert advice; a trade union is a 
collaboration already; and public authorities might have particular interests they wish to 
pursue. 
 
When it comes to resources, the variables Staff size and Brussels office both have negative 
effects on the dependent variables. This means that the less resources interest groups have, the 
more likely they are to lobby in coalitions which supports the second hypothesis of this thesis. 
However, since none of the results in Table 4.10 are significant the null hypothesis cannot be 
rejected. The variable Organisation form reveals that national associations are more likely 
than individual organisations to lobby in coalitions, whereas European associations and Other 
are less likely. EU member has a negative effect on the dependent variable, indicating that 
interest groups from Norway are more likely to join coalitions than interest groups from the 
other Nordic countries - who are members of EU. The variable Registration year has a 
positive effect on the dependent variable. Accordingly, the more recently interest groups are 
registered in the Transparency Register, the more likely they will lobby in coalitions.  
 
It is important to note that association does not equal causation (Schrodt 2013, 297). 
Nonetheless, because the sample is small, I would avoid claiming anything from this 
regression analysis. The analysis is a necessary step in investigating explanations as to why 
Nordic interest groups lobby in coalitions, but further studies are needed to verify it. 
 
10 I also converted the variable Interest type represented into a dummy where 1 was business groups and 0 all 
other groups, but the results did not make any decisive differences. 
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Table 4.10: Logistic regression: lobbying in coalitions 
 
  DV: Lobbying in coalitions 
  Model 6 
   
Interest type represented Business groups Ref. 
 
 Consultancies -1.867 
(1.335) 
 NGOs 0.225 
(0.637) 
 Trade unions/Prof.org. -0.319 
(0.684) 
 Institutions 0.002 
(1.031) 






Resources Staff size -0.058 
(0.053) 
 Brussels office -0.195 
(0.514) 
Control variables   
Organisational form Individual organisations Ref. 
 National associations 0.995 
(0.621) 
 European associations -1.531 
(1.303) 
 Other 0.781 
(1.193) 
EU member  -0.379 
(0.711) 
Registration year  0,021 
(0.075) 
Constant  1.276 
(1,079) 
N  143 
 










4.4 Concluding summary of the empirical analyses 
 
Over the past three decades there has been a significant growth in lobbying in the EU and 
there is now a dense EU interest group system (Coen and Richardson, 2009, 3). Nordic 
interest groups increasingly register in the Transparency Register, a database that lists interest 
groups that participate and try to shape the decision-making processes in the EU institutions. 
Most of these Nordic interest groups represent business, but a fair share are also NGOs, and a 
smaller number of interest groups represents consultancies, trade unions/professional 
organisations, institutions and public authorities.  
 
The majority of the Nordic interest groups are individual organisations, but also a large 
proportion of them are national associations, which makes sense regarding the corporatist 
background of the Nordic countries. For example, the national associations Confederation of 
Danish Industry (DI) and Finnish Energy are among the Nordic interest groups that spend the 
most on lobbying activities. Otherwise, most of the Nordic interest groups are small in size 
and have low lobbying expenses. Nonetheless, the majority of the Nordic interest groups have 
a Brussels office, indicating that Nordic interest groups are active in their efforts to influence 
the EU institutions and decision-makers. This is nonetheless expected given the fact that they 
are registered in the Transparency Register.  
 
A certain proportion of the Nordic interest groups choose inside lobbying strategies: 32% of 
the Nordic interest groups have had meetings with EC high level officials, 19% of them have 
membership in EC expert groups, 14% have EP passes and 15% of the Nordic interest groups 
have had direct meetings with MEPs. Overall, that means that a relatively small percentage of 
the 803 Nordic interest groups apply inside lobbying strategies to influence EU decision-
making. However, this is understandable considering that 47% of the Nordic interest groups 
are business groups. As seen in the analyses, business groups are more likely to meet with EC 
high level officials and MEPs than other interest types represented. This is also the case when 
it comes to number of passes to access the EP premises, with the exception of consultancies. 
Business groups are not more likely to have membership in EC expert groups, however. One 
could have debated whether it is actually lobbying resources that play the pivotal part, but as 
seen there is a mixture of interest types represented that spend the most on lobbying activities. 
Nonetheless, lobbying resources seem to matter for all inside lobbying strategies, except for 
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IG membership in EC expert groups. As discussed, this makes sense considering that the 
Commission desires to appear balanced.  
 
As expected, the analyses showed that interest groups based in Denmark, Sweden or Finland 
(countries that are members of the EU) are more likely to have meetings with EC high level 
officials, as well as having direct meetings with MEPs and EP passes. However, this does not 
seem to be the case for IG membership in EC expert groups. Although the effect is not 
statistically significant, it is arguable that EEA membership matters and maybe reduces the 
effect. These results may be in accordance with the argument of Bernhagen and Mitchell 
(2009), stating that Norwegian companies compensate for lack of representation in EU 
institutions by inside lobbying in Brussels. Moreover, there are some small differences 
between the Nordic countries that are members of the EU, but as we have seen, this is as 
expected. Finnish interest groups, in particular, are very active in lobbying the EU and it is 
clear that they focus on inside lobbying strategies, as 42% meet with the EC high level 
officials and 40% have had meetings with MEPs.  
 
The analyses also reveal that a proportion of the Nordic interest groups apply outside 
lobbying strategies. 24% of the Nordic interest groups have media access, i.e. have been 
mentioned in Euractiv, Euronews and/or Politico.eu. Particularly Nordic institutions and 
resource-rich groups have appeared in these media outlets. The results showed that business 
groups are more likely to gain access compared to other interest types represented, with the 
exception of institutions. This signifies that business groups rely on both inside and outside 
lobbying strategies. Additionally, the more resources interest groups have, the more likely 
they will have media access. This is in line with the literature which argues that more 
resources make it possible to choose both outside and inside lobbying strategies (Beyers 2004; 
Binderkrantz 2005; Dür and Mateo 2016, 80; Weiler and Brändli 2015). Particularly, having a 
Brussels office seems to matter a great deal for outside lobbying strategies. Having a Brussels 
office makes it easier to engage in outside lobbying (Mahoney 2008, 163).  
 
The percentage of interest groups mentioned in the media is quite similar among Danish, 
Swedish and Finnish interest groups: around 20-24% of these interest groups are mentioned in 
the media. What is notable, however, is that as many as 37% of the Norwegian interest groups 
appear in the three media outlets, a fairly high percentage compared to the other Nordic 
interest groups. Appendix D shows that the Nordic interest groups that appear in the media 
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most frequently are institutions or resource-rich business groups. Thus, it can be argued that 
Norwegian interest groups focus on outside lobbying as well as inside lobbying strategies 
(mostly targeting the Commission), to compensate for their lack of representation in the EU 
institutions.  
 
A main finding of the analyses, however, is that how long an interest group has been 
registered in the Transparency Register seems to be of importance for the choice of all 
lobbying strategies. This indicates that the more established interest groups are in lobbying 
the EU, the more likely they will gain access to bureaucrats and legislators – as well as 
gaining access to the media. Consequently, while lobbying resources and group characteristics 
matter for the choice of most lobbying strategies, the aspect of building reputation and trust is 
of importance when it comes to all lobbying strategies applied by the Nordic interest groups.  
 
This might explain why so many Nordic interest groups choose to lobby through coalitions. In 
the analysis of the online survey it was discovered that roughly 75% of the Nordic interest 
groups that participated in the online survey prefer to lobby in coalitions as their main strategy 
to influence the EU decision-making. Based on their answers, in addition to their 
organisational characteristics and lobbying resources, it appears that lobbying resources are 
crucial in the choice of lobbying alone or in coalitions. However, the explanatory analysis 















5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The aim of this thesis was to understand and explain the choice of lobbying strategies applied 
to influence EU policymaking. Explaining lobbying strategies is important because they 
contribute and determine levels of lobbying success. Furthermore, they provide important 
information about how national and sectional interests are represented and articulated at the 
EU level. The research questions answered in the thesis are as follow: (1) What lobbying 
strategies do Nordic interest groups employ when trying to shape EU legislation? And (2) 
what explains the types of lobbying strategies used to influence EU institutions and decision-
makers? 
 
I built my argument on a prominent school of thought that claims that organizational lobbying 
resources and group characteristics are key explanations of lobbying strategy choice. Such 
lobbying resources include financial resources (i.e. lobbying expenses), staff size and having a 
Brussels office. This argument was tested through a mixed methodological approach, 
combining the analysis of quantitative data and qualitative empirical evidence. I constructed a 
built for purpose dataset that provides information about all Nordic interest groups registered 
in the EU Transparency register. The data sources used to construct the original dataset was 
the EU Transparency Register, Lobbyfacts.eu; an online survey I conducted; an original 
dataset assembled by Adriana Bunea and Raimondas Ibenskas on meetings between IGs and 
MEPs based on the EP official website; and the media outlets Euractiv, Euronews and 
Politico.eu.  
 
The empirical analyses showed that a considerable fraction of the Nordic interest groups 
chooses inside lobbying strategies and/or outside lobbying strategies. Moreover, the online 
survey answers revealed that a large majority prefers to lobby in coalitions. Resources seem to 
matter for all inside lobbying strategies with the exception of Nordic IG membership in EC 
expert groups, which might be explained by the Commission desires to appear balanced. 
Additionally, it can be argued that Norwegian interest groups focus on outside lobbying as 
well as inside lobbying strategies (mostly targeting the Commission), to compensate for their 
lack of representation in the EU institutions. Moreover, there are some small differences 
between the Nordic countries that are members of the EU, but as we have seen, this is as 
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expected. Finnish interest groups in particular are very active in lobbying the EU and it is 
clear that they focus on inside lobbying strategies. 
 
A main finding of the analyses, however, is that how long an interest group has been 
registered in the Transparency Register seems to matter for all lobbying strategies. This 
indicates that the more established interest groups are in lobbying the EU, the more likely 
they will gain access to bureaucrats and legislators – as well as gaining access to the media. 
Consequently, while lobbying resources and group characteristics matter to the choice of most 
lobbying strategies, the aspect of building reputation and trust is of importance when it comes 
to all lobbying strategies applied by the Nordic interest groups.  
 
 
5.1 Implications for future research 
 
That resources matter for the choice of lobbying strategies (with the exception of IG 
membership in EC expert groups) for Nordic interest groups is as expected, and in line with 
existing literature and research on interest groups lobbying in Brussels. Nonetheless, although 
lobbying through coalitions is a very frequent form of collective action at EU level, there have 
been few systematic analyses of EU lobbying coalitions (Bunea and Baumgartner 2014, 20). 
This thesis shows that the majority of Nordic interest groups choose to lobby in coalitions as 
their main strategy, indicating that lobbying resources are decisive to their choice. However, 
further research is required to verify these results. Increasing the number of units, in addition 
to a systematic study of different types of coalitions, would be advantageous.  
 
Moreover, the findings in this thesis are the result of the chosen theoretical and 
methodological approach. I believe that relying on the resource and characteristics-
explanation was a necessary first step in explaining lobbying strategies of Nordic interest 
groups. Nonetheless, several of the interest groups that participated in the online survey stated 
that the choice of lobbying strategies depends on the policy issue at hand. Consequently, 




Furthermore, in order to make any generalizations, a large-N study was applied in this thesis. 
I included all Nordic interest groups that are registered in the EU Transparency Register. 
When interest groups are registered in the EU Transparency Register, it is reasonable to 
assume that they have the aim to shape and make their demands and preferences heard in the 
EU policymaking process. Consequently, it should be possible to make generalizations. 
However, a suggestion to further research would be to expand the sample to include interest 
groups from other EU member states and other Non-EU member states (but associated EEA 
countries) such as Iceland or Switzerland. This could enhance the comparative dimension to 
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Table A: The ten interest groups per Nordic country that most frequently meet with EC high 
level officials.  
 









Confederation of Finnish 
Industries EK (64) 
Telenor (17) 
 
Landbrug & Fødevarer 
- Danish Agriculture 
and Food Council 
(DAFC) (20) 
 





Roundtable for Europe's 









Keskusliitto – Central 
Union of Agricultural 
Producers and Forest 






The Danish Chamber 
of Commerce (Dansk 
Erhverv) (19) 
 
Telia Company AB (39) 
 
















LEGO System A/S 
(13) 
 
Investor AB (Investor 
AB) (32) 
 
Neste Oyj (33) 
 













Statkraft AS (6) 
 
Danish Shipping (11) 
 
Confederation of 












European Forest Institute 
(EFI) (20) 
 
Norsk Hydro (6) 
 
A.P. Møller - Mærsk 
A/S (APMM) (10) 
 
Volvo AB (Volvo) (13) 
 
Finnish Forest Industries 
Federation (Metsäteollisuus 











    





Table B: Norwegian interest groups with memberships in EC expert groups.  
 
Name of interest group EC expert groups 
PER BOQVIST Skills development and careers in the blue economy (E03399), 
Other 
 
The International Association 
of Independent Tanker 
Owners (INTERTANKO) 
European Sustainable Shipping Forum (ESSF) (E02869), 
Stakeholders Advisory Group on Maritime Security (E01087), 
High Level Steering Group for Governance of the Digital 
Maritime System and Services (E03450), Cooperation group 
on Places of Refuge 
Finance Sector Union (FSU) Group of representatives of financial services employees (UNI 
Europa) (E00651) 
LANDSORGANISASJONEN 
I NORGE (LO-Norway) 
Advisory Committee for Vocational Training (X01803), 
Comité consultatif pour la sécurité et la santé sur le lieu de 
travail (X01211) 
Confederation of Norwegian 
Enterprise (NHO) 
Advisory Committee for Vocational Training (X01803), 
Comité consultatif pour la sécurité et la santé sur le lieu de 
travail (X01211) 
Statnett Commission expert group on electricity interconnection 
targets (E03412) 
Telenor High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (E03591) 
Trident Alliance (TA) European Sustainable Shipping Forum (ESSF) (E02869) 
DNV GL European Sustainable Shipping Forum (ESSF) (E02869) 
Norwegian Air Shuttle ASA 
(NAS) 
Consultative Forum on EU External Aviation Policy (E03519) 
DNB Bank ASA (DNB) Commission expert group on electronic identification and 
remote Know-Your-Customer processes (E03571) 
Norwegian Association 
Against Noise (NAAN) 
Noise Expert Group (E02809) 
 
Forbrukerrådet (NCC) European Consumer Consultative Group (E00849) 
Bellona Europa Innovation Fund Expert Group (E03593) 
Matvett SA EU Platform on Food Losses and Food Waste (E03421) 
Universitetet i Oslo (UiO) Multi-stakeholder Group on Environmental Claims (E03327) 
SINTEF Ocean AS (OCEAN) European Sustainable Shipping Forum (ESSF) (E02869) 
Consortium of European 
Social Science Data Archives 
(CESSDA ERIC) 
Commission Expert Group “Executive Board of the EOSC” 
(E03632) 
 
OsloMet - Storbyuniversitetet 
(OsloMet) 
Expert group on the implementation of the Erasmus+ 
programme (E03018) 
Norwegian University of 
Science and Technology 
(NTNU) 
Commission operational expert group of the European 
Innovation Partnership on Raw Materials (E03392) 
 
Val Videregående Skole AS 
(Val) 
Skills development and careers in the blue economy (E03399) 
 





Table C: Names and nationalities of the MEPs that the Nordic IGs have had meetings with. 
 
 
Sirpa PIETIKÄINEN (FI) Evin INCIR (SE) Vlad-Marius BOTOŞ (RO) 
 
Jutta PAULUS (DE) Tom BERENDSEN (NL) José Ramón BAUZÁ DÍAZ 
(ES) 
 
Pär HOLMGREN (SE) Romana TOMC (SI) Marie-Pierre VEDRENNE 
(FR) 
 
Pernille WEISS (DK) Gwendoline DELBOS-
CORFIELD (FR) 
 
Alexandra GEESE (DE) 
Pascal ARIMONT (BE) Cindy FRANSSEN (BE) Heidi HAUTALA (FI) 
 
Margrete AUKEN (DK) Jeroen LENAERS (NL) Claudia GAMON (AT) 
 
Henna VIRKKUNEN (FI) Karin KARLSBRO (SE) Martin HOJSÍK (SK) 
 
Bas EICKHOUT (NL) Alice KUHNKE (SE) Norbert LINS (DE) 
 
Bernd LANGE (DE) Patrick BREYER (DE) Sabine VERHEYEN (DE) 
 
Esther de LANGE (NL) Stéphane SÉJOURNÉ (FR) Leila CHAIBI (FR) 
 





Kira Marie PETER-HANSEN 
(DK) 
 
Svenja HAHN (DE) Saskia BRICMONT (BE) 
Niklas NIENASS (DE) Birgit SIPPEL (DE) Tilly METZ (LU) 
 
Ville NIINISTÖ (FI) Yana TOOM (EE) Isabel WISELER-LIMA 
(LU) 
 
Rasmus ANDRESEN (DE) Daniel FREUND (DE) Petri SARVAMAA (FI) 
 
Andrus ANSIP (EE)   
   
 
Sources: Adriana Bunea and Raimondas Ibenskas’ original dataset on meetings between IGs and MEPs based on 









Table D: The ten interest groups per Nordic country that appear most frequently in media. 
 
Norwegian IGs Danish IGs Swedish IGs Finnish IGs 
Equinor (18) 
 
A.P. Møller - 
Mærsk A/S 
(APMM) (54) 
Ericsson (62) Nokia (92) 





(Volvo Cars) (58) 
Fortum Oyj (Fortum 
Corporation) (18) 




Spotify AB (49) Confederation of 
Finnish Industries EK 
(EK) (16) 
Telenor (10) Rasmussen Global 
(RG) (31) 
















Statnett (8) Ørsted A/S (21) Stiftelsen The 
Stockholm 
Environment 
Institute (SEI) (15) 





















Novo Nordisk A/S 
(16) 






Sources: Euractiv, Euronews and/or Politico.eu. Notes: Number of media mentions in parentheses. 
 
